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ABSTRACT
The recent history of Freedmen's Town, Houston's oldest African American
community and one of the city's most contested spaces, is explored. For the
past twenty years, developers, mayors and downtown business interests have
pushed for the redevelopment of Freedmen's Town, one of the poorest and most
run-down sections of the city and located in the shadow of downtown. The
various strategies used by the city to stimulate and control development and by
residents to prevent the city's interventions and attain community control are
investigated. Research was conducted in the manuscript collections of the
Metropolitan Research Center at Houston's Public Library, and interviews were
conducted with developers, residents, activists and public officials.
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INTRODUCTION
In the shadows of downtown Houston a few hundred people live in what remains of the
city's oldest African American community, Freedmen's Town. As bulldozers knock down
houses and explosives implode larger buildings, patches of vacant land grow, isolating the
remaining houses. At one end of Freedmen's Town construction crews are erecting a large,
mixed-income community. Until a few years ago, when the city evicted the last tenants, the
large public housing development Allen Parkway Village sat on this site.
Nothing is being constructed on the rest of the vacant land in Freedmen's Town. The
City of Houston owns much of the neighborhood and has vague plans to redevelop the area in
order to attract office workers eager to live close to downtown. The mostly old and African
American residents displaced by the demolitions have not been compensated and have
scattered throughout the city.
How could this happen in 1999?
The recent obliteration of most of Houston's Freedmen's Town recalls the era of urban
renewal, purportedly long-gone, when cities plowed under centrally located areas where poor
and minority people lived. The story of Freedmen's Town resonates painfully with many other
neighborhoods in many other cities. Poor people of color have frequently been pushed out of
central cities when downtown living becomes fashionable. But this type of urban renewal is
not supposed to happen anymore. Cities are not supposed to bulldoze communities, especially
not places like Freedmen's Town, which was recognized on the National Register of Historic
Places.
How could this happen in Houston?
Why did the City of Houston, famous for adherence to laissezfaire ideologies, intervene
in Freedmen's Town, whose residents vociferously opposed the demolition of public housing
and the destruction of much of the historic neighborhood? How could city officials argue for
these interventions within a public sphere whose controlling rhetoric emphasized the
superiority of market forces to public interventions?
Why did it take so long?
Downtown business interests, real estate developers, and four mayoral
administrations pursued the redevelopment of this area for twenty years. How could the
relatively powerless residents - mostly poor renters--resist the powerful array of forces aligned
against them? What strategies did the residents employ to foil the city's plans?
FIGURE ONE
Remaining houses surrounded by vacant lots and in
the shadow of downtown, May 1999
Western Edge of Freedmen's Town, 1999
FIGURE TWO




A brief history of Houston's Freedmen's Town
African-Americans predominated in the Fourth Ward, practically since the founding of
Houston. Freed slaves who flocked to the area known as "Freedman's Town" after the Civil War
largely built what became known in the African-American community as the 'mother ward.' "
Over the next fifty years, as the city outgrew the original wards, affluent neighborhoods and the
expanding downtown commercial area encroached on the Fourth Ward. Massive, federally
funded redevelopment programs targeted the area starting in the 1930s, still characterized by
nineteenth-century southern vernacular housing, and therefore labeled a slum. A major
highway loop consumed a large chunk of the community in 1959. Even more divisive, a
federally funded 'white-only' public housing development reserved for returning World War II
veterans appropriated more than thirty-seven acres of the original ward. Known as San Felipe
Courts when built in 1939 and now called Allen Parkway Village (APV), the public housing
development covered more than one-quarter of Freedmen's Town. The modernist housing
separated itself physically as well as racially from the rest of the neighborhood, leaving a
massively diminished community, which nevertheless survived.2
Even diminished in size, Freedmen's Town remained a remarkably intact district. Given
that most buildings date from before 1936, the neighborhood stood as an embodiment of an
early twentieth-century African American community. Freedmen's Town provided social and
cultural support to its residents and to members of the City's greater African American
1 Interview Gladys House, President of the Freedmen's Town Association. The Freedmen's Town residents
prefer Freedmen's Town to the commonly used name Fourth Ward, since technically the Fourth Ward
extends much farther than the Freedmen's Town district. The neighborhood is generally thought to
encompass eighty blocks, of which forty are included in the historic district. I will generally use
'Freedmen's Town' when referring to the neighborhood, and Fourth Ward when referring to the larger
area.
2 San Felipe Courts Historic District. National Register of Historic Places Inventory-Nomination Form.
community, one of the largest in the South3 . Important cultural institutions, such as
churches, schools, black-owned businesses, and libraries flourished in Freedmen's Town.
(Figure Three) Jack Yates, legendary early pastor of Antioch Baptist Church, founded Houston
College in 1885. Initially teaching skills that students used in building their own homes, such
as bricklaying and carpentry, Houston College eventually evolved into Texas Southern
University, one of the largest historically black colleges in the nation.4
Most of the institutions in the neighborhood were founded while Freedmen's Town was a
very mixed income community. 5 Over time, however, the neighborhood became poorer, relative
to the rest of the City. By the 1920's, most of the residents rented their homes, which had
already begun to show wear and tear. 6 Despite the increasing impoverishment of Freedmen's
Town residents, black institutions anchored the neighborhood and provided stability. Until the
mid- 1930's, the Fourth Ward housed ninety-five percent of all black owned businesses in
Houston. [Figure Four] The Pilgrim Building for example contained the Negro Chamber of
Commerce and the NAACP. (Figure Five)
3 Bullard, Robert D. Invisible Houston: The Black Experience in Boom and Bust. College Station: Texas A
& M University Press. 1987. Houston's African American population has accounted for at least 20
percent and as much as 32 percent of the City's population during this century. In 1990 African
Americans numbered 448,148 and accounted for 27.5 percent of the City's total population.. See City of
Houston . Comprehensive Housing Assessment Strategy CHAS 1993.
4 "We Shall Not Be Moved" Houston Metropolitan Magazine, January 1991. Page 53 and Texas
Trailblazers pamphlet.
5 The variety of housing types in Freedmen's Town, such as shotgun row houses, bungalows, and fancier
two story houses, such as Reverend Yates house reflects the typical income mixing in older sections of the
city.
6 Urban League report, 1929. Evidence points to an erosion of Black homeownership as early as the turn
of the century. See Passey, Mary Louise: Freedmantown: The Evolution of a Black Neighborhood in
Houston, 1865-1880. Unpublished Master's Thesis, Rice University, 1993.
The Carnegie Colored Library
FIGURE THREE
Demolished during construction of Insterstate Highway




Demolished to make way for office towers
Harmon's Dry Goods, the Rainbow Theater, and dozens of night clubs and beauty shops
contributed to the Fourth Ward's reputation as the "Harlem of the South."7 By the 1970's
most of the businesses had disappeared, through the encroachment of downtown and
particularly through the construction of a major highway through the heart of the black
business district. 8 Many churches, however, remained, and the neighborhood retained its
important symbolic importance for the African American community.
The Housing Authority restricted Allen Parkway Village to whites only for more than
twenty years. When federal law mandated desegregation in the 1960's, Houston initially
complied by admitting a few African-American families into the development. By the late 1970s
Allen Parkway Village was populated by a majority of African Americans. Around this time,
various coalitions of the City's elite clamored for the demolition of the development. The land,
at this point situated next to a major highway interchange and 60 story towers occupied by the
likes of Exxon, would command a huge price, according to interested developers who
approached the mayor. The aerial photograph in Figure Six shows the proximity of downtown
to Freedmen's Town.
The neighborhood continued to demonstrate unusual stability - in 1984 over forty-five
percent of Freedmen's Town residents had lived in the neighborhood for at least 10 years.
Despite the stability the neighborhood was vulnerable to development. Poverty was increasing,
supporting services were being eroded and very few residents owned their own home. 9.
7 Freedmen's Town Historic District. National Register of Historic Places Inventory-Nomination Form.
Item 8 page 9
8 According to City Directory listings the neighborhood's major commercial street, West Dallas, housed
276 businesses/residences and only 2 vacancies in 1948, 248 businesses/residences and 25 vacancies
in 1957, 153 businesses/residences and 47 vacancies in 1968 and only 33 businesses/residences and
10 vacancies in 1988. See Morrison & Formy's City Directories for 1948 and 1957. Polk's City Directory
1968 and Cole Publications City Directory for 1988-1989.





Freedmen's Town Downtown Houston
Courtesy of ESA Data. Approximate Scale: l'=1000'
Setting the Stage
The people in the development business know that that land is a very, very valuable piece of land.
Hell, it's right downtown.' 0
Former Mayor of Houston Jim McConn
Houston grew explosively during the 1970s. Refugees from northern cities suffering
from de-industrialization flocked to Houston, which was booming with oil industry jobs. New
master planned communities grew on the fringes of the city to accommodate the growth. Inner
city residential areas, roughly defined by the loop formed by Highway 610, suffered as
residential investment concentrated on the 'edge cities' forming on the periphery. Although
investment in residential development generally shifted outward, major corporations built
signature high rise commercial towers downtown. Even as Houston spread outward, downtown
commercial development prospered and developed right up to the border of the Fourth Ward.'
During this period, African Americans made noticeable strides in breaking down
residential segregation. For decades middle class families seeking homeownership had been
steadily migrating out of Freedmen's Town, which offered mainly rental housing. Out-migration
sped up during the 1970's, as increased economic opportunities for African Americans made
homeownership viable for many more families. The 6700 people that lived in Freedmen's Town
by the late 1970's were older and poorer than previous populations. This climate of
abandonment of the central city by both the developers working on the fringe and middle class
African Americans moving towards new opportunities, coupled with a robust interest in
developing corporate headquarters downtown, seemed to destine Freedmen's Town for
redevelopment.
Believing that the neighborhood was beyond repair, the city refused to invest in
upgrading infrastructure or other city services. Mayor Hofheinz called the neighborhood a
"living coffin," and argued that since "people are moving out of the area.. .it would be
10 Dallas Moming News, June 9-10, 1985
unintelligent for us to put the area at the top of our list of priorities." 12 Hofheinz clearly
believed that the neighborhood would soon transition, and that investing in infrastructure for a
dying community was not necessary. 13 Hofheinz also noted that Allen Parkway Village, at that
point more than thirty years old, was "almost beyond repair."14 The essence of modernity when
built, the development had never been updated and had suffered from neglect. By the 1970s
the public housing that had cleared away the slum was now itself considered blight.
Mayor Hofheinz' condemnation of Freedemen's Town incensed residents such as
Annabelle "Mama" Fontenot, who commented that "with each urban renewal project, the
skyline gets closer." 15 Fontenot believed that City Hall had planned the decay of her
neighborhood so that developers could take over the area more easily. Hofheinz lost the next
mayoral election to Jim McConn, who campaigned in Freedmen's Town and could attribute his
victory at least in part to the strong support of the African American community.16
In spite of McConn's sympathy with the plight of Freedmen's Town during the election,
he too came to believe that the area was beyond repair. When bigwig developer Kenneth
Schnitzer quietly approached the Mayor with an offer to purchase the ailing Allen Parkway
Village, McConn jumped on board by preparing the first of the City's many proposals to HUD to
demolish the public housing.17 McConn did not mention Schnitzer's proposal or involvement at
the time, but he did suggest to HUD that the Allen Parkway Village site could be worth $250
million, which would subsidize far more housing than Allen Parkway Village offered. Schnitzer
later admitted that he had arranged financing to purchase Allen Parkway Village for $63 million
during the McConn administration.18
11 Joel Warren Barna "Money and Meaning," The See-Through Years. Houston: Rice University Press. for
See discussion in chapter one of the growth of Houston's skyline from 1977 to 1983.
12 Claudia Feldman, "Historic Fourth Ward called 'living coffin,"' Houston Chronicle, September 23, 1976.
13 See 1979 report from the Mayor's Urban Policy Advisory Board, quoted in Bullard, page 36, for a
discussion of the City's focus on providing services to the growing communities on the periphery at the
expense of inner-city residential neighborhoods in general.
14 Claudia Feldman, "Historic Fourth Ward called 'living coffin,'" Houston Chronicle, September 23, 1976.
'5 "Public Interest vs. Private Interest: The fate of Fourth Ward," Houston Breakthrough, November 1976.
16 Bullard, Invisible Houston, Page 124. Discusses the endorsement of McConn by African American
organizations.
17 See Chairman Henry B. Gonzalez' remarks during the 1993 Congressional Hearing of the U. S. House
Subcommittee on Housing for the secret, informal proposals tendered by Houston in the late 1970s.
18 Dallas Morning News, June 9-10, 1985
Unfortunately for the developers eager to acquire the valuable land, HUD denied the
formal request of the Housing Authority of the City of Houston (HACH) to demolish Allen
Parkway Village and instead issued a $10 million grant in 1979 to rehabilitate the thirty-eight
year old development. The Housing Authority waited almost twenty years to spend the grant,
and instead continued to request permission to raze Allen Parkway Village. Only after HUD
finally allowed the city to demolish most of the development did HACH apply the 1979 grant
towards building replacement housing. HUD finally allowed the demolition of Allen Parkway
Village because, by the 1990s, the agency's agenda to de-concentrate public housing dovetailed
with the city's enduring agenda to rid downtown of Allen Parkway Village and to spark the
revitalization of Freedmen's Town.
Though HUD's recent focus on -and new funding for - de-concentrating public
housing greatly facilitated the eventual demolition, the Housing Authority had at times enjoyed
the tacit support of HUD, especially during the Reagan Administration. Even with HUD's
support, however, the Housing Authority was not able to carry through its plans to demolish
because of the resistance of residents, who were opposed to being de-concentrated. City
officials and developers completely underestimated the residents' ability to impede their plans,
and never suspected in 1977 when the City first considered selling the public housing to
developers, that the residents would capably wage a twenty year war against the plan.
Preserving Freedmen's Town
HACH and the city might have gained insight into the depth of the fight ahead had they
been paying attention to another, seemingly unrelated, fight also going on in 1978 nearby. At
the turn of the century Fourth Ward had extended to the geographical heart of Houston. By
1978, municipal structures and corporate towers had replaced most of the original Fourth
Ward buildings on the downtown side of the highway. One of the last extant buildings from the
old Fourth Ward on that side of the highway was also one of the most important. Founded in
1869, Antioch Baptist Church, the oldest and most prestigious historically black congregation
in the city, occupied the same building designed in 1875 by African American architect and
former slave Richard Allen.19 The congregation was under tremendous pressure to sell to
nearby Cullen Center,20 a multi-tower office complex wedged around the old church. Led by
the founder's great grand daughter the congregation opted not to sell, leaving the church now
completely surrounded by glassy office towers, as shown in Figure Seven. Figure Eight
depicts the house adjacent to Antioch Baptist in the 1920s. The process of galvanizing the
congregation to defend its important legacy led to the successful application of Antioch Baptist
to the National Register of Historic Places, the first such listing of a Freedmen's Town
structure. 2 1
Valuing Freedmen's Town
The congregation of Antioch Baptist decided that the legacy of the Church and the
history it embodied should be preserved even if the land underneath the old church had
become enormously valuable. At about the same time, a few blocks away, developer Kenneth
Schnitzer whispered to the Mayor that the land underneath Allen Parkway Village had become
too valuable for the public housing development that sat there. Although that deal fell apart,
through three successive mayoral administrations the idea endured that Freedmen's Town and
Allen Parkway Village would be enormously valuable if they were cleared of aging buildings and
people.
19 Texas Trailblazer Series 2, No. 5. Richard Allen
20 Cullen Center, Inc. executives would later sponsor the Founder's Park proposal to remake all of the
remaining Freedmen's Town area.
21 Afro-American Collection, Metropolitan Research Center. Antioch Missionary Baptist Church of
Christ.
Antioch Baptist Church 1999
FIGURE SEVEN
Antioch Baptist Church and Adjacent House 1920s
FIGURE EIGHT
Juneteenth Celebration. Part of Antioch







During the next twenty years, many different characters and stakeholders would argue
over the value of Freedmen's Town. Some sought to preserve the history or the architecture.
Some cared mostly about preserving the resource of affordable housing at Allen Parkway
Village, while others simply wanted to continue to live in their own homes in Freedmen's Town.
Those that believed in the historical, architectural, cultural or social value of Freedmen's Town
struggled against the prevailing belief that maximizing the economic value of the land should
take precedence over conserving the neighborhood.
PART I: THE CITY'S STRATEGIES
CHAPTER Two
The Whitmire Administration Strategy: 1983-1989
It just seems like everything that's happened, step by step, has been directed toward getting rid of
Allen Parkway. Allen Parkway represents mega-dollars; it's a big deal and big deals are meant to
be turned.22
Housing Authority Employee Charles Taylor
Introduction
When Kathryn Whitmire became Mayor in the early 1980s, Houston developers had
already expressed strong interest in purchasing the Allen Parkway Village site. HUD, under the
Carter Administration, had rebuffed all the demolition request of her predecessor, Jim McConn,
and had openly urged the newly elected Whitmire to dissolve the board of directors of the
Housing Authority, which was poorly run and plainly in service to the development community.
Whitmire installed her own board of directors, which commissioned a study to evaluate the
feasibility of either rehabilitating or razing Allen Parkway Village and to examine potential
redevelopment of the surrounding Fourth Ward. That study also recommended razing Allen
Parkway Village, and much of the surrounding area, to take advantage of strong demand for
high-income residential and commercial uses in the downtown area.
Armed with the study reinforcing the logic of demolishing the Fourth Ward to make way
for higher and better uses, and facing a far more hospitable attitude towards eliminating public
housing in the HUD of the Reagan Administration, Whitmire aggressively pursued the
demolition of Allen Parkway Village and Freedmen's Town. During her long tenure as mayor
throughout the 1980s, Whitmire never wavered from her belief that development in the Fourth
Ward was inevitable and that her administration should appropriately pave the way for the
developers. Returned to the tax rolls as high-rise, high-income apartments or commercial
towers, the Allen Parkway Village site would produce tax revenue for the city and, perhaps
more importantly, would replace the embarrassingly run-down Allen Parkway Village.
Whitmire could afford to ignore the protests of the residents, since her liberal credentials and
strong record of hiring minorities secured her the minority vote, especially given the
conservative candidates that usually opposed her.23 Under Whitmire's administration, the City
Council, the Housing Authority and the Planning Office worked together in an effort to bring
about the transformation of the Fourth Ward.
Shortly after the ERA report recommending demolition the City Council endorsed a new
demolition request to HUD. The Housing Authority systematically depopulated the
development, inflated both renovation estimates and the potential value of the land underlying
the public housing site, and experimented with racial steering to dilute the African American
tenants organization with Vietnamese immigrants. Meanwhile, Whitmire's head of planning,
Efraim Garcia, devised a strategy to package the surrounding Fourth Ward to developers.
Garcia created a consensus among a group of landowners, which controlled more than eighty
percent of the Fourth Ward, to sell their properties in a block, at a set price. Garcia figured
that once Allen Parkway Village was razed, the difficulty of amassing large tracts of land
constituted the primary obstacle to redeveloping the Fourth Ward. The City's planning office
sought to facilitate the transfer, via a Memorandum of Agreement with the coalition of
landowners.
Strategies of the Housing Authority of the City of Houston (HACH)
With the wholehearted support of the City Council, the Housing Authority applied to
HUD for permission to raze Allen Parkway Village. HACH argued, based on the recently
completed report, that the cost of repairing the run-down, aging development did not justify
rehabilitation. Instead, HACH proposed to sell the valuable land and to replace the lost
22 Dallas Morning News, June 10, 1985
housing units on other unspecified sites throughout the city. HACH's proposal appealed to
Reagan Administration officials eager to encourage privatization. HUD officials reported in
1985 that the demolition proposal was sure to be approved. 24 As Elbert Winn, a former deputy
chief of Dallas HUD office explained, "the Reagan administration would waive the Ten
Commandments to get that site to those developers. Big business, the big dollar people,
wanted those sites, and they (Reagan administration officials) would do anything for the good
ol' boys -anything." 25
Even before the Mayor, City Council, and HUD officials lent their support to the demolition
proposal, HACH officials assumed that Allen Parkway Village would be razed. Hoping to avert a
public relations disaster when the more than 2000 public housing residents would be
displaced, HACH implemented a policy designed to dilute the residents' political power. From
1980 to 1985, HACH denied housing at Allen Parkway Village to every qualified African
American family that applied, and instead placed a large number of recent Indo-Chinese,
predominately Vietnamese, residents. In the late 1970s, 66 percent of Allen Parkway Village
residents were African American and 5 percent were Indo-Chinese. By 1985, African
Americans represented only 33 percent of the population whereas Indo-Chinese residents made
up 58 percent. 26 The Indo-Chinese residents, newly arrived in the U.S., wielded far less political
clout and possessed far less political savvy than the African American residents, who could
count on leveraging relationships with local, state and federal lawmakers as well as with
Houston's large African American community. Unlike the African American residents of Allen
Parkway Village, the Indo-Chinese residents had no ties to the surrounding neighborhood of
Freedmen's Town. HACH's strategy worked to some extent, as tensions surfaced between the
existing tenants and the new arrivals, and some residents moved out.
23 Observed a Houston activist: "In the way that only Nixon could go to China, I guess only Kathy
Whitmire, a female liberal, could attack poor, black people in the Fourth Ward."
24 See discussion by HUD official Warren Linquist in Dallas Moming News, June 9, 1985.
25 IBID
26 Luis Cano Collection, Metropolitan Research Collection, Houston Public Library. The papers of a
former commissioner and board member of the Housing Authority documents the racial steering lawsuit.
In the wake of a lawsuit filed by the ACLU on the behalf of African American applicants
denied entry to Allen Parkway Village because of their race, HACH ceased its policy of racial
steering. In fact, HACH ceased to steer any new residents at all into Allen Parkway Village after
1984, and would board up apartments as residents vacated. HACH also moved to evict many
Indo-Chinese residents who had paid a kickback to a Housing Authority employee to gain entry
to apartments. The Resident Council hired lawyers for the Indo-Chinese residents, who argued
that they did not understand that the money solicited by the Housing Authority employee was
illegal. Although the lawyers won a temporary reprieve from eviction for the illegal tenants,
most eventually moved out, further depopulating Allen Parkway Village.
After abandoning racial steering, the Housing Authority pursued a strategy of
depopulating Allen Parkway Village. The Housing Authority instigated a cycle of depopulation
at Allen Parkway: the Housing Authority refused to spend allocated funds on modernization,
arguing that the development was not worth repairing. By letting the units deteriorate as they
became vacant, the Authority did not place new tenants, leading to an attenuation of the
resident population.
Another method used by the Housing Authority to depopulate Allen Parkway Village was
to neglect routine maintenance. Avoiding maintenance contributed to the inhabitability of
many apartments and also saved the Authority money. The original architect of Allen Parkway
Village, Karl Kamrath, signed a sworn affidavit claiming that "Allen Parkway Village has not
received even the very minimal maintenance which those buildings, or any buildings for that
matter, require."27 Since HUD had issued a $10 million grant to the Housing Authority to
renovate Allen Parkway Village, the Housing Authority could not claim that renovation or repair
of the development was too expensive.
In fact, HACH Executive Director Earl Phillips argued that a comprehensive renovation
of Allen Parkway Village was prohibitively expensive and claimed that spending the $10 million
would be a waste of money if the development would still be flawed. Phillips pointed out that
the 1983 Technical Report recommending demolition of Allen Parkway Village estimated that
repairs would cost $36.2 million. However, this figure drew on the Housing Authority's own
estimates for repairs, and the housing authority official who supplied the estimate later
testified that he had "manufactured the hell out of those figures."28 According to the official,
Charles Taylor, "they [HACH] were trying to get the rehabilitation costs up significantly high
enough so as not to be able to justify rehabilitation." Thus the Housing Authority manipulated
the consultants' findings in order to provide a rationale for their pre-existing agenda to
demolish Allen Parkway Village. 29
The depopulation strategy contributed to the Housing Authority's overall demolition
strategy in several ways. First, fewer residents would minimize demolition expenses, since the
Housing Authority would have to pay both moving expenses and rent subsidies for the
displaced residents. Fewer residents would translate into lower relocation expenses.
30
Depopulation also bolstered HACH's argument that the development was obsolete. Housing
Authority officials even suggested that the lack of residents at Allen Parkway Village proved
that people did not want to live there. Contesting the Housing Authority's interpretation of the
high vacancy rates at Allen Parkway Village, Elbert Winn, former deputy manager of the Dallas
area HUD office that oversaw HACH during the 1980s, said "The (housing authority's) agenda
was always to get those 1,000 families off that site. I believe that Allen Parkway was the tilting
point for the Fourth Ward. If they get Allen Parkway, then the Fourth Ward will go (because)
that is the hub of the Fourth Ward."31 According to the residents and their lawyers, this
intentional scheme to depopulate Allen Parkway Village explained the enormous vacancy rates
in an era when more than 10,000 eligible families waited for a public housing unit to become
27 Dallas Morning News, June 9,1985
28 See affidavit of Charles Taylor, from Lenwood Johnson's papers, Congressional Hearing, 1985 and the
Dallas Morning News, June 9 and June 10, 1985.
29 IBID
30 Cost of relocating 450 people would be 37.4 million, more than renovation costs and would be
exacerbated by the traditional difficulty of siting replacement public housing in Houston as well as the
limited funding for affordable housing in the era of Reagan's budget cuts.
31 Housing Authority employee, quoted in Dallas Morning News, June 9, 1985
available. 32 By 1985, the intentional depopulation of Allen Parkway Village had resulted in a
less than 50 percent occupancy rate in 1985, down from 95 percent in 1977.
As former employee Charles Taylor interpreted the Housing Authority's overall behavior during
the early 1980s, "It just seems like everything that's happened, step by step, has been directed
toward getting rid of Allen Parkway. Allen Parkway represents mega-dollars; it's a big deal and
big deals are meant to be turned."33
Department of City Planning Strategy:
While the City Council and the Housing Authority, under Executive Director Earl
Phillips, pressed on with the application to demolish Allen Parkway Village, Director of City
Planning Efraim Garcia pursued a strategy to facilitate the sale of Freedmen's Town, in toto, to
a developer. The finely grained patterns of land ownership in Freedmen's Town contributed to
the difficulty of developing large projects in the neighborhood, as the cost and the aggravation
of assembling land discouraged developers. The group of landowners recognized the alignment
of their interests, since most wished to sell their land, which was marginally profitable at best.
Garcia formalized the landowners into a group that held at least 85 percent of Freedmen's
Town land. The landowners signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the City in 1984 that
stipulated a minimum price of $20 per square foot for their land, if Garcia could find an
interested developer. Garcia assured potential developers that the 2500 existing houses in the
neighborhood would be razed to make way for the condominiums, office towers and high-end
retail that the Whitmire administration wanted.
Justifying the displacement caused by the City's overarching plan to redevelop the
entire neighborhood, Housing Authority Executive Director Earl Phillips claimed that
"Piecemeal development would displace the residents anyway ... .We have a responsibility to
be the leveraging mechanism."34 The Whitmire administration sought, therefore, to take
32 Luis Cano papers.
33 IBID
34 IBID
control of development that was believed to be inevitable. If the residents were to be displaced
by the forces of the market anyway, they would be better off if the City could leverage its
holdings in Freedmen's Town to purchase replacement housing elsewhere. It seems clear that
Whitmire and Phillips were convinced of the inevitability of development in Freedmen's Town
because they were convinced that they would be able to demolish Allen Parkway Village, which
served as a guard against gentrification.
Despite the City Planning Director's efforts to package Freedmen's Town, no developer
made an offer on the land. The delay in demolishing Allen Parkway Village explained, in part,
developers' reticence to acquire Freedmen's Town. Garcia acknowledged that "It (Allen Parkway
Village) is central. Without that tract, the whole thing will collapse." The Director remained
hopeful insisting "we wouldn't have gone this far along and done all this if HUD hadn't already
given some pretty strong indications."35 Garcia's optimism was not unfounded, since the Mayor
and City Council were strongly committed to removing the public housing.
The city officials had less control over the other important cause of developers' clear
lack of interest in acquiring Freedmen's Town-the soft real estate market. Even Kenneth
Schnitzer, the developer credited with first proposing to buy the Allen Parkway Village site in
1977, no longer wanted to buy the land. Garcia urged the landowners to renew the
Memorandum of Agreement, originally in effect for only one year, betting that the market would
soon turn around.
The breathtaking dive of the Houston real estate market throughout the late 1980s
proved Garcia wrong, as no developer ever made an offer on the aggregated land. The soft real
estate market also bought the residents time to craft innovative strategies to prevent the sale of
their neighborhood, such as winning designation on the National Register of Historic Places,
and joining forces with the public housing residents at Allen Parkway Village.
Despite dedicated collaboration between city agencies, the Whitmire Administration's
effort to demolish Allen Parkway Village and packaging Freedmen's Town for developers failed.
35 IBID
Neither Housing Authority Executive Director Earl Phillips nor Planning Director Efraim Garcia
foresaw the residents' ability to thwart their efforts via lawsuits, press coverage, and leveraging
relationships with, for example, Members of Congress who controlled HUD's purse strings.
Fundamentally, however, the Whitmire Administration had crafted a flawed strategy, insofar as
the sizzling real estate market of the late 1970s had fizzled into the deep recession of the
1980s. The often touted market demand for Freedmen's Town did not exist. No buyer made on
offer on the aggregated Fourth Ward parcels, and the demolition opponents successfully argued
that the Housing Authority had vastly overestimated the value of the Allen Parkway Village site.
Conclusion
In addition to the Whitmire Administration, the Reagan Administration had an impact
on the Freedmen's Town/Allen Parkway Village dispute. The crash of the Houston real estate
market in 1979 followed by the crash in the international oil market in 1982 condemned
Houston to deep recession during the years when the rest of the country was booming.
Houstonians in general, and real estate developers in particular, believed throughout the 1980s
that Houston would bounce back and that real estate prices would return to the soaring growth
rates of the 1970s. Looking at the growing economy throughout the rest of the county,
Houstonians believed that the Reagan revolution would inevitably reach Houston.
According to real estate economist William Wheaton, Houston developers completely
misunderstood what was happening in the Houston real estate market.36 In 1977, when
Kenneth Schnitzer made the first offer on Allen Parkway Village, the economy was already
showing signs of slowing down. By 1979, the real estate market crashed, Schnitzer revoked his
offer, and no development would be seen in Freedmen's Town for another decade. Yet, the
mayor and the Housing Authority remained convinced that developers - agents of the market-
had spoken, and that the redevelopment of Freedmen's Town was therefore inevitable.
36 William Wheaton, Lecture : "Real Estate Economics," Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for
Real Estate, May 11, 1999.
After HUD forced the Housing Authority to withdraw its application to demolish Allen
Parkway Village in 1989, the market, in the guise of two of Houston's most influential
businessmen, tried its hand. Although the Whitmire Administration had failed in its various
efforts, it, along with the Reagan revolution, left Freedmen's Town in a precarious situation,
vulnerable to private developers. The next chapter discusses the first attempt to remake
Freedmen's' Town instigated by private rather than public forces.
CHAPTER THREE
Founder's Park 1990
Each of the Housing Authority's four proposals to raze Allen Parkway Village
presupposed that the elimination of the tattered public housing development would stimulate a
transformation of the neighboring Fourth Ward. According to the Housing Authority's many
consultants, the blighting influence of Allen Parkway Village had depressed prices and
suppressed development for fifty years. Its destruction would unleash market forces and drive
up land values. In a rare moment when the Housing Authority had actually rescinded its
demolition application, due to the mounting legal pressure imposed by the residents, private
developers stepped in to propose their own scheme for the Fourth Ward. The developers in this
case decided to pre-empt the Housing Authority, by creating a vision and planning for
redevelopment of the Fourth Ward before demolition of the public housing had taken place.
Their development, known as Founder's Park, did count on the eventual demolition of Allen
Parkway Village and eventually faltered on the heated opposition of many of the neighborhoods'
stakeholders - residents, landlords and ministers.
The developers also faced a changed world, as the rest of the country sunk into
recession. Houston's long recession in the 1980s had abated somewhat, but the city had not
yet absorbed the excess stock overbuilt during the previous decade. Little development would
occur downtown for several years to come.
Genesis of Founder's Park
Founder's Park had a lofty beginning. From sixty stories above the aging Freedmen's
Town, Max Schuette, president of insurance giant American General, looked east across
Freedmen's Town towards downtown. From that vantage, he could see the deterioration of the
housing stock, the growing patches of vacant land, and hundreds of thousands of commuters
traversing the area. He could also see the office of his friend Mary Marshall, chief of the Cullen
Center real estate development that, along with an interstate highway, formed the eastern
boundary of Freedmen's Town. 37 [Figure Nine] The two powerful corporate chiefs decided that
the time had come for someone to do something with the area between their corporate
headquarters, and that as the leaders of two of Houston's most prominent businesses, they
should spearhead the redevelopment. 38
Rumors flew around the Fourth Ward in early 1990 that the two corporations had
started to acquire land. In publicly announcing their plans in February, spokespeople carefully
explained that the companies had just begun to explore possibilities. The preliminary concept
envisioned some measure of affordable housing and incorporated some element of the area's
history in a plan that would site thousands of market-rate residences in Freedmen's Town and
the surrounding area.39 The name Founder's Park referred to the presence of one of Houston's
founding fathers, John Allen, in a neighborhood cemetery. Despite its cautionary tone, the
announcement by American General and The Cullen Center, Inc. created immediate
speculation on Fourth Ward land. Houston real estate company Revenue Properties purchased
10 acres of Fourth Ward land within two weeks of the announcement. Revenue Properties bet
on the power of American General and the Cullen Center to overcome the minefield of
opposition that had already defeated other developers, including the City. In fact, Revenue
Properties bought the land from another real estate development company, Metropolitan, which
had mistakenly banked on the success of an earlier redevelopment proposal and had been
forced into bankruptcy as a result.40
37 Cullen Center actually sits on land that was at one time part of Freedmen's Town. The Cullen family
showed tremendous foresight in blocking up parcels in the 1950s; the development of a highway barrier
between their land and the rest of Freedmen's Town, facilitated the expansion of downtown businesses up
to the highway. Developed in the 1960s and 1970s, Cullen Center replaced all of the original structures
except, notably, Antioch Baptist Church. Interview with Saverio Giammalva.
38 Houston Chronicle, August 12, 1990. Wall Street Journal, April 12, 1991. Note that the Cullen and
Wortham families are among the most prominent Houston families.
39 "Extensive Development of Fourth Ward Proposed"Houston Chronicle, January 25, 1990
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In addition to the backing of very powerful local players, Founder's Park enjoyed at least
one additional advantage over prior attempts to redevelop the Fourth Ward. State Senator
Craig Washington (D-Houston) had recently engineered passage of legislation tailored to
facilitate just this sort of large-scale urban revitalization. In 1989, Washington sponsored
enabling legislation for the creation of Tax Increment Finance (TIF) Districts that would allow
cities to target underdeveloped zones. Houston could raise money for the district by issuing
bonds collateralized by the future increase in property taxes. The revenue raised would then
pay for needed infrastructure improvements, streets and sewers for example. Washington
modified TIF district enabling legislation by requiring that one-third of the revenue generated
by the tax increment would fund affordable housing development in the future. He hoped that
the TIF district would appease housing advocates, who could look forward to a steady stream of
income for new housing development, and the downtown business interests, who thirsted for
redevelopment of the area. Opponents of TIF districts argued that they siphon off revenues
from the rest of the city; future taxes that might contribute to schools and other shared
services would go instead to repaying the bond for one neighborhood's infrastructure.41
Although TIF Districts ensnare citizens in a zero sum game42, developers insisted that
the difficult task of redeveloping the Fourth Ward required such measures. If Houston were to
declare the Fourth Ward a TIF district, the developers could count on necessary infrastructure
improvements that the city otherwise would not be able to afford. Even more important for the
developers, the TIF district would have a board of directors that could institute land use
controls. In a city without zoning, the developers could then be sure to maximize their
holdings' worth.
State Senator Washington became an even more valuable ally to the Founder's Park
developers when he won election to the U. S. House of Representatives, succeeding the late
Mickey Leland. Whereas Leland had fought passionately for the preservation of Allen Parkway
41 Houston Chronicle, January 26, 1990
42 Interview with Barry Klein, Houston Property Rights Association President.
Village and the Fourth Ward and had effectively staved off demolition with federal legislation
preventing the use of federal funds to demolish Allen Parkway Village, Craig Washington was
committed to demolition. In one of his very first acts as congressman, Washington spoke to a
consortium of downtown business interests about the need to demolish Allen Parkway Village
and about the usefulness of TIF districts in effecting neighborhood change43 . Armed with the
TIF district idea and Washington's advocacy the corporate leaders proceeded with Founder'
Park.44
Washington believed that he could satisfy everyone. He pointed out that his TIF district
legislation directed one-third of the increased tax revenues into the creation of affordable
housing. By allowing developers to increase land values in the Fourth Ward, affordable
housing advocates could count on sharing the wealth. Increased property values, which
typically push out lower income tenants, would under a TIF district generate increased funding
for affordable housing. Faced with the suggestion that many others had tried and failed to
bring the various stakeholders in the area together, Washington replied breezily: "sure they all
distrust each other, but they all trust me."4 5 The new congressman soon found out that the
Founder's Park proposal generated all kinds of distrust. 4 6
For different reasons, both the non-resident property owners and the residents
distrusted Washington's proposal. The property owners, usually strongly in favor of
redevelopment, registered concern that the TIF district would grant the developers power of
eminent domain. Many of the families that owned land in Freedmen's Town remembered
bitterly the Housing Authority's takings in the neighborhood when Allen Parkway Village was
first built in the late 1930s. Outraged by the prices paid for their land, the landowners claimed
that they could not purchase land anywhere else in the city to replace the loss in Freedmen's
43 Bennett Roth, "Washington backs new plan for Allen Parkway Village", Houston Chronicle, January 18,
1990, page 26A.
44 Houston Post, February 2, 1990
45 Houston Chronicle January 26,1990
46 Steve Olafson, "Washington gets an earful over housing" Houston Post, May 19, 1991. Within a year,
residents met Washington's attempts to bring disputants together with deep distrust. One residents told
Washington "You're the hatchet man." He is no longer in office.
the 1990s, the landlords worried that if the city used its power of eminent domain, or granted it
to another entity, they would again pay less than the property was worth.
Willing to sell, but only at a fair price, groups of landowners lobbied extensively against
the proposal. 47 In an unusual alliance, the Houston Housing Concern, a group dedicated to
preserving Allen Parkway Village, joined forces with the property owners in arguing against the
TIF district to the City Council and others. The residents of Allen Parkway Village and
Freedmen's Town, distrusted the Founder's Park proposal but withheld judgement until they
had more information. Observed an Allen Parkway Village resident "offfiand, it sounds
ridiculous, but I have to see some facts and figures."4 8 The public housing residents in
particular distrusted Washington, who as an attorney had defended the Housing Authority
against the residents' litigation. In response to the growing opposition, Washington defended
the developers and insisted that they would not move forward with Founder's Park without an
endorsement from the community. 49 In April, the developers announced that a public hearing
would be held in the summer to incorporate neighborhood input into the Founder's Park plan.50
Meanwhile, in an unsurprising move, the Housing Authority announced a search for a
developer for the Allen Parkway Village site.5 1 The Housing Authority sought to outsource the
demolition of the development because the public housing residents had engineered passage of
federal legislation known as the Frost-Leland Amendment that prevented the use of federal
funds to demolish Allen Parkway Village. By requiring developers to pay for demolition, the
Housing Authority sought to skirt the restrictions of the Frost-Leland Amendment, which had
sunk the Housing Authority's last redevelopment proposal. Angered by the Housing Authority's
continued effort to eliminate public housing, neighborhood residents and activists noted that,
in asking for an application fee of $10,000 from interested developers, the Housing Authority
47 Huge disparities existed between the owner's stated asking price of $20 per square foot, and Founder's
Park estimate of $3 to $4.
48 Houston Chronicle, January 29, 1990
49 Houston Chronicle, January 26,1990
50 Houston Post April 24, 1990.
5' "Allen Parkway Decision," Nation's Cities Weekly, February 14, 1990. The Housing Authority sought to
comply with HUD's request for a strategy for Allen Parkway Village. In lieu of complete demolition, which
seemed to have set the bar too high for anyone except the deep-pocketed directors of Founder's
Park.5 2 After the Authority slashed the fee to $50, the residents began working on their own
plan.53 That no other developers submitted proposals suggested that market demand for the
Allen Parkway Village site did not exist.54
'New Urbanist' Plans Fail To Marshal Community Support
The consortium of businesses behind Founder's Park hired new urbanist gurus
Elizabeth Plater-Zyberg and Andres Duany to create the Founder's Park plan. The pair had
become famous by creating new towns, such as Seaside Florida, that had an old fashioned
nineteenth-century texture. Small streets, neighborly public spaces and corner grocery stores
characterized a typical New Urbanist town. The famous architects looked forward to working in
an existing place that had in its heyday exemplified New Urbanist design principles.
Houstonians, particularly architects, remained skeptical that the new plan would be able to
incorporate the existing urban fabric. Architecture professor Nia Dorian Becnel warned, "I
don't support any plan that wipes out a historic neighborhood and the indigenous people. I
don't believe in instant towns."55
A scant two weeks after the announcement of Duany and Plater-Zyberg's involvement in
Founder's Park, Duany announced their resignation. Although all sides described the split as
amicable, skeptics guessed that Duany's insistence on community input rattled the Founder's
Park directors. According to resident-activist Lenwood Johnson, the removal of Duany "proves
HUD rejected, HACH sought to maintain 150 units, and to allow a developer to raze and develop anything
on the remainder of the site.
52 Katherine Kerr, "Allen Parkway bidders facing $10,000 charge," Houston Post, May 1, 1990, p. A-17
and Lori Rodriguez, "City asking $10,000 to submit project plan," Houston Chronicle, May 1, 1990.
53 Katherine Kerr, "Authority slashes Allen Parkway fee," Houston Post, May 10, 1990. Unfortunately for
the residents their plan, authored by Architecture Professor Nia Dorian Beenel and her students was
stolen the night before they were due to present it to the Housing Authority. Becnel untimely death
shortly thereafter prevented the re-creation of the stolen plan. Interview Lenwood Johnson.
54 James Robinson, "Private sector turns its back on housing project," Houston Chronicle, November 10,
1990.
55 Houston Post, June 20, 1990
to me that they (Founder's Park) have a specific plan, and anyone who brings anything different
to it is out . .. they are not really interested in community forums." 56
The Founder's Park plan violated the mandate that the Housing Authority was under to
site some low income housing at Allen Parkway Village. In fact, the Housing Authority did
follow that mandate by rejecting the group's proposal to redevelop Allen Parkway Village. 57 The
Housing Authority thus strongly suggested that it had not cut a prior deal with Founder' Park,
especially since no other group had submitted a proposal. The Housing Authority specifically
objected to the lack of public housing proposed by Founder's Park, whose plan envisioned fewer
than the Housing Authority's base line requirement of 150 units to replace the 1000 units.
Founder's Park Director Schuette defended his proposal, saying that 150 units of public
housing would not work in Founder's Park. "This plan is workable," he explained "because we
are going to be able to create real estate values in the area that do not presently exist." Even
though Founder's Park spokespeople had insisted that a master plan for the community did not
yet exist, clearly the developers knew how much tolerance they would have for public housing.
The Fourth Ward residents displaced by the redevelopment would be accommodated by the
affordable housing spun off by TIF district revenues at some future date, and not therefore in
their neighborhood.
Undettered by the Housing Authority's rejection and the loss of the famous planners,
Founder's Park once again turned to a prominent, out-of-town planner to give shape to the
grand vision. In July, the organization announced that Gary Hack, MIT professor and noted
urban planner, had agreed to lead the planning process. Hack announced a four day visioning
session in which neighborhood residents, landowners, city officials and other stakeholders
would come together to fashion a shared vision, if possible. Founder's Park officials continued
to insist that they would back down if the differing stakeholders could not reach a broad
consensus about the future of the area.
56 Houston Post, July 4, 1990
57 Jane Baird, "Housing Authority seeks new Allen Parkway bids," Houston Post, August 11, 1990.
The visioning session attracted hundreds of participants but failed to sway opponents.
Landholders continued to fear the overarching power of the TIF district, arguing that the plan
would be irrelevant, since the TIF district board could change it at will later. Meanwhile, many
public housing residents refused to attend the meeting, claiming that "the process is rigged.
We don't want to work with them so they can say when the thing's finished, 'You participated,
you can't object now."58 Despite the dissent, the Founder's Park leaders felt encouraged
enough by the turnout to proceed with the planning process. The Cullen Center president
noted that he "didn't see anything here that couldn't be dealt with," and Hack selected a group
of participants to work with him in the coming months to elaborate the plan. 59
Hack's plan referred to the historical character of the neighborhood but the residents
felt that it called for the destruction of their community. He believed that 100 of the 800
remaining houses that had contributed to the historic district could be saved, and he proposed
clumping the historic houses together in a small district.60 Although the plan called for the
elimination of the rest of the area, including Allen Parkway Village, the new neighborhood of
nearly 5000 new residences would have a similar ambience to the Freedmen's Town it replaced.
Hack's plan resonated with 'new urbanist' ideas, calling for a pedestrian oriented community,
where residents could walk to the corner grocery. 6 1 Freedmen's Town residents noted that,
with no more than ten percent of the new construction targeted towards low to moderate
income people, most of the current Freedmen's Town population could not live in Founder's
Park.
Founder's Park opponents objected to more than just the loss of units of affordable
housing. They objected to the loss of the community itself. Professor Nia Becnel, author of the
Allen Parkway Village application to the National Register of Historic Places, explained that
Freedmen's Town is "the genesis neighborhood of the African-American community of this city.
. a neighborhood that says 'I started here.' Someone's cultural heritage should not be on the
58 Interview Lenwood Johnson.
59 Houston Chronicle, August 13, 1990.
60 Wall Street Journal, April 12, 1991
61 Houston Chronicle, December 4, 1990
marketplace." Residents objected to the naming of the development after the white founding
father of Houston, whose connection to the neighborhood was weak. The name 'Freedmen's
Town,' was connected to the rich continuity of African American history. Founder's Park
referred to history, but not the history of the people who lived there and not the history that
had won the listing on the National Register. The residents felt that the Founder's Park plan
simply revived every previous effort to displace Freedmen's Town residents, and labeled planner
Gary Hack, "the hired hit man."6 2
Fate of Founder's Park
The directors of Founder's Park released Gary Hack's plan in December, about one year
after the organization came forward with its intention to redevelop Freedmen's Town. The plan,
a fifty-eight page document articulating a vision of a nearly new neighborhood of mostly middle
to upper income residences and small clusters of retail centers interspersed among parks and
pedestrian pathways, was never implemented. The would-be developers insisted that they
would implement their vision when the city resolved the Allen Parkway Village problem and
when the city, county and state signed commitments to assist the developers.63 When the city
did finally resolve the Allen Parkway Village problem, the Housing Authority itself became the
developer, funded by HUD.
Conclusion
The Founder's Park plan failed to prevail because the developers could not overcome
opposition from residents and landowners. The land owners believed that the Founder's Park
developers would use eminent domain to buy land at deflated prices, because many of them
could remember the unfair prices paid by the City of Houston for the land taken to build Allen
Parkway Village in the 1930s. 6 4 The public housing residents believed that the Housing
Authority had once again joined forces with private developers, who would reap large profits by
62 Wall Street Journal, April 12, 1991
63 Houston Chronicle, December 4, 1990
evicting the tenants. While that scenario did not hold true in this case, as the Housing
Authority declined to work with Founder's Park, the residents of Freedmen's suspected that the
Founder's Park scheme would build houses for middle and upper income people, thereby
displacing mostly black and poor residents just as the city's slum clearance program had done.
By hiring expensive, out-of-town planners and subscribing to a lengthy planning
process, the leaders of Founder's Park appeared to embrace a new kind of urban development
for Houston. Rather than hatch a plan in the back rooms of city hall, the developers invited all
dissenters to join them in creating the plan. Even though the planners never quite achieved a
legitimate level of community participation, they created a plan anyway. The purpose of the
planning process thus seems to have been to create a sense of ownership by Founder's Park of
the right to direct the redevelopment of the neighborhood and to co-opt the residents into
adopting the Founder's Park vision.
The corporate chiefs that dreamed up Founder's Park drew on a salient precedent --
Houston founder John Kirby Allen, a real estate speculator who by virtue of his burial in a
Freedmen's Town cemetery lent his name to Founder's Park. In trying to entice investors and
residents, Allen described his swampy, new town as "part reality, part mirage, a city always
becoming, a city where what it's going to be counts more than what it is." The Founder's Park
developers were not as successful as Allen, since the 5200 people who lived in the Fourth Ward
decided that what was already there-Freedmen's Town-counted more than what the
Founder's Park developers wanted the neighborhood to become.
64 Interview Barry Klein.
CHAPTER FOuR
Hope VI 1993-1999
New Mayor Bob Lanier Tries His Hand at Resolving the Impasse
When Bob Lanier ran for Mayor of Houston against incumbent Kathy Whitmire, he
blasted her record in the Fourth Ward, claiming that she had abandoned the neighborhood and
its people. Throughout her long tenure as Mayor during the 1980s Whitmire had supported the
demolition of Allen Parkway Village and had encouraged the City Planning Director to sign a
contract with most of Freedmen's Town landlords to sell their land, in aggregate, to a developer.
Her administration' s redevelopment agenda for Freedmen's Town did not incorporate the
current residents and failed to succeed, in large part because of resident resistance. 65
Despite their dwindling numbers, Freedmen's Town and Allen Parkway Village residents
were more politicized, and suspicious of any city sponsored redevelopment initiative in their
community by the time Lanier took office. 6 6 Frustrated by the intractable disputants, District
Court Judge Hoyt had ordered the Housing Authority and the residents into mediation to
resolve the multiple lawsuits against the Housing Authority. The ongoing mediation
constrained the new mayor from taking an active role in finding a solution to the dispute; he
promised, however, that if the negotiations failed, he would take a leading role.
True to his word, after negotiations failed in 1992, Lanier began examining the City's
options, and by 1993 he had a new strategy. Though the strategy was new the agenda was the
same: demolition of Allen Parkway Village. The Housing Authority would apply for a new, huge
source of funds from HUD, whose urban revitalization program, known as HOPE VI, targeted
the nation's most severely distressed public housing. HOPE VI grants funded massive
transformations, including in many cases large-scale demolition, of selected developments.
65 Michael Cinelli, "Demolish, replace most of Allen Parkway Village," Houston Post, September 26, 1991
and Alan Bernstein, "Lanier says Fourth Ward policy failure," Houston Chronicle, September 26, 1991.
Lanier actively pursued the HOPE VI grant, which would not only give the city a huge infusion
of money to fund construction, but would almost certainly facilitate demolition and would also
legitimize it. 6 7 HUD, along with the general public, had deemed that throughout the country
high-density public housing, such as Chicago's notorious Cabrini Greene, had failed.
According to conventional wisdom, the warehousing of extremely poor people in one place had
fostered high crime rates and other social pathologies. The severe, modernist design that
characterized many public housing developments only exacerbated the problem by isolating
residents from the larger community and by stigmatizing the public housing itself, which was
easily distinguished from market-rate housing.
HOPE VI aimed to reinvent public housing by targeting the most severely distressed
developments, those that warehoused the poor in obsolete, deteriorated and crime-ridden
developments. By demolishing most of the buildings and rebuilding contemporary housing that
fit into surrounding neighborhoods, HUD hoped to integrate public housing developments into
their surrounding community. The new developments would be so appealing that higher
income people would want to live there and would be willing to pay market rents. Mixed
income communities that did not look like stereotypical public housing developments would
presumably eradicate the social pathologies associated with high-density public housing.
Lanier figured that Allen Parkway Village fit the description of severely distressed public
housing.
Lanier also figured that HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros would look kindly upon
Houston's application, since he would likely remember that Lanier, in a prior role as member of
the Texas Highway Commission, had approved a spur road around San Antonio, then governed
66 By the time he took office, the fragile Fourth Ward had lost one-half of its population between the 1980
and 1990 census. Allen Parkway Village had also lost most of its population, from nearly 1000 families in
1980 to fewer than 30 by Lanier's inauguration.
67 Kathy Kiely, "Lanier wants to relocate Allen Parkway Residents," Houston Chronicle, March 30, 1993, p.
A-1. Lanier's envisioned tearing down Allen Parkway Village, and using proceeds from that and new
HUD grant to buy foreclosed apartment complexes from the Resolution Trust Corporation, which had
plenty of apartment properties in its portfolio in the wake of the S & L crisis in Texas.
by Mayor Cisneros. According to HOPE VI director Milan Ozdinec, Houston received the HOPE
VI grant because Cisneros needed to return the favor to Lanier. 68
The application submitted by HACH and endorsed by the City Council requested $32
million to demolish 850 units at Allen Parkway Village, to renovate 150 units, and to build 420
new units in either the surrounding neighborhood or scattered throughout the city.69 The
Housing Authority proposed to use the proceeds from the sale of Allen Parkway Village land not
only to replace the lost public housing units, but also to build more units than the law
required.
If Lanier's relationship with the Secretary ensured that Houston would receive one of
the highly competitive HOPE VI grants it did not ensure that Lanier's vision for the
redevelopment of Allen Parkway Village would prevail. HUD awarded Houston a HOPE VI grant
in 1993, but did not approve the details of the proposal.
HUD Secretary Cisneros Mediates Between Mayor Lanier and the Residents
Cisneros announced the award, and discussed his vision for the redevelopment of Allen
Parkway Village at a well-attended congressional hearing called by Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Housing, Henry B. Gonzalez. Gonzalez, a staunch supporter of the Allen
Parkway Village Resident Council and opponent of demolishing existing housing units, called
the hearing, held at Allen Parkway Village so that Cisneros, Lanier and Housing Authority
Executive Director Joy Fitzgerald could explain their plans to the residents and hundreds of
interested Houstonians. Gonzalez also ensured that the residents and their supporters had
plenty of opportunity to articulate their concerns about the City's plans and to advocate for
alternatives, such as complete renovation.
68 Milan Ozdinec, presentation at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Urban
Studies and Planning, April 21, 1999.
69 James Robinson, "Council backs housing project demolition," Houston Chronicle, July 15, 1993 and
David Plesa, "Despite objections, council Oks Allen Parkway Village demolition," Houston Post, July 15,
1993, page A-21.
A few days before the meeting, Lanier expressed confidence that the hearing would have
no impact on his plans, telling the press that "the fate of Allen Parkway Village was sealed."
7 0
He had received word from HUD that Houston would receive its HOPE VI grant, with which he
intended to demolish Allen Parkway Village and sell the land. He believed that the opposition of
the residents would not interfere with his plans. Upon arriving at the meeting, however, Lanier
quickly found out that the fate of Allen Parkway Village was far from sealed. Secretary
Cisneros pulled the Mayor aside before the meeting to warn him that HUD was looking for a
promise from the city that none of the Allen Parkway Village site would be sold
71
. At the
hearing, Cisneros made his point forcefully:
This is a very important principle because I know this has been in the press over the
years and there has always been a suspicion that somehow the city, the housing
authority, HUD, the Federal authorities, were in collusion to sell this beautiful tract of
land to developers who would then convert it into highrise commercial development or
more expensive residential development. I have said to Mayor Lanier that to prove
that that is not the case, I would be willing to say with the mayor.. .that not a single
square foot of this site ought to be sold away from the housing authority. 72
Cisneros thus tried to hew a middle road, between the agenda of pro-developer Mayor Lanier
and the agenda of anti-demolition Chairman Gonzalez. Cisneros envisioned the demolition of
the old buildings and the replacement on the same site of new, subsidized units. Lanier had
little choice but to agree with Secretary Cisneros, who controlled the disbursement of more
than $30 million. Although Gonzalez applauded Cisneros' promise not to sell any of the land,
he still insisted that any demolition would be illegal, under the Frost-Leland Amendment. Wary
as ever, the residents of Freedmen's Town and Allen Parkway Village nevertheless remained
somewhat encouraged by the Secretary's proposal. Allen Parkway Village Resident Council
President Lenwood Johnson called Cisneros' idea "a step in the right direction." 73 Freedmen's
70 Houston Post, December 10, 1993.
71 Michael King, "Once More Unto the Village Dear Friends, Once More!" Houston Press, December 23,
1993, page 7.
72 House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on Housing and Community
Development Hearing. December 14, 1993. Page 13.
73 James Robinson, "Cisneros Has Plan to Save Housing Site" Houston Chronicle, December 15, 1993,
page LA.
Town Association President Gladys House "appreciateld] his show of faith-but I only trust God.
. . because Secretary Cisneros is on a limited term ... and a new government or entity [could]
come in and just disregard this so-called good faith."7 4
While agreeing with residents that the Allen Parkway Village site should remain a
resource for affordable housing, Cisneros joined a host of Houston area officials in
recommending that the existing buildings should be demolished. He attributed the decline of
Allen Parkway Village to "a mixture of mismanagement and obsolescence." Conceding that the
Housing Authority had traditionally mismanaged the development,75 Cisneros nonetheless
believed that the development had become obsolete. Underscoring his belief that the design of
Allen Parkway Village made the development unsuitable, and therefore should be scrapped,
Cisneros stated:
It is my firm belief that public housing ought to be characterized, where possible, by low
densities so that we don't jumble people up together, by attractive design, so that people
can feel they are entitled to live in conditions that are as attractive as anyone else in
America. 76
With its high densities and, according to Cisneros, unattractive design, Allen Parkway Village
described a distressed public housing development waiting for rebirth. Cisneros thus put the
blame for its decline on both the mismanagement by the Housing Authority and the outmoded
design of the buildings themselves.
Secretary Cisneros' pledge to keep the Allen Parkway Village site as a resource for public
housing encouraged the residents, who nevertheless continued to object to Cisneros' belief that
the development itself was obsolete. Arguing that the neglect of the Housing Authority largely
explained Allen Parkway Village's deterioration, The Resident Council, with the support of the
Freedmen's Town Association, continued to press for redevelopment of the full 1000 units.
74 House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on Housing and Community
Development Hearing. December 14, 1993. Page 27.
7s Scott Harper, "Auditors give an F' for upkeep," Houston Post, December 18, 1992, p. A-27 and Houston
Chronicle, December 12, 1992 for federal auditors evaluation of the Housing Authority. The Gonzalez-
Cranston affordable housing act of 1990 required HUD to evaluate and inventory the nation's public
housing. None of the 30 apartments occupied at Allen Parkway Village passed the audit, resulting in a
failing grade for HUD and some nominal repairs by HACH.
Rebutting the experts' analysis of the pathologies created by such places as Allen Parkway
Village, the residents liked living there and continued to insist that at full residency, the
development would be even better. Reverend Thompson, a member of an ecumenical group
dedicated to supporting the residents, explained in an editorial:
After reading that APV is a dilapidated old eyesore, a warehouse ghetto ... a visitor would
be surprised to see that APV is quite the opposite. It is an island of peace in the heart
of a throbbing city, an oasis with expanses of grass and towering oaks.. .APV is no
warehouse.. .But it is exciting to think what more it could be if authorities would
encourage creative imagination and give priority to human development over real
estate. 77
Also rebutting Cisneros' argument that Allen Parkway Village was obsolete, Architectural
Historian Stephen Fox pointed out that the Housing Authority had already renovated several
other contemporaries of Allen Parkway Village. In fact, one of the renovated developments,
Irvinton Courts, was not only as old as Allen Parkway Village, but actually had the same exact
design, since the Housing Authority saved money by using the same plans drawn for Allen
Parkway Village. Clearly, then, the Housing Authority's argument that APV was too obsolete to
renovate was a rhetorical strategy in support of its demolition agenda.78
Despite the residents' persistent claims that their ideal would be to live in a renovated
Allen Parkway Village, and that the development's design enhanced the quality of life, city and
HUD officials continued to believe that the development's older design imposed an inferior
quality of life. Mayor Lanier questioned the paternalistic attitude of some of the middle class
advocates for renovation. Addressing a lawyer and civil rights activist, Lanier asked "Have you
visited these places?.. .You think this is a place for people to live? Oh bullshit. That's bullshit"79
76 House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on Housing and Community
Development Hearing. December 14, 1993.
77 Vincent Thompson, "Saving Allen Parkway Village will benefit whole community," Special to the
Houston Post, , 1991. Reverend Thompson responded to the argument voiced by Housing Authority
Commissioner John Zipprich among others, that Allen Parkway Village created a 'reservation' of poverty.
See Houston Chronicle, April 25, 1991.
78 House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on Housing and Community
Development Hearing. December 14, 1993. Page 30.
79 Michael King, "Once More Unto the Village Dear Friends, Once More!" Houston Press, December 23,
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While Lanier may have been justified in questioning the attitude of the middle class, suburban
activists, he continued to overloook overwhelming evidence that the residents themselves
believed that Allen Parkway Village was a good place to live, if taken care of properly.
Cisneros' award of a HOPE VI grant did loosen up the deadlocked Allen Parkway Village
dilemma, insofar as all of the stakeholders looked forward to utilizing $32 million to improve
public housing on the Allen Parkway Village site. However, Cisneros could not resolve the
remaining, fundamental point of contention-how much of Allen Parkway Village would be
demolished and how many units of affordable housing would take its place. Lanier continued
to agree with Housing Authority officials that most of Allen Parkway Village should be
demolished. The residents believed that all of it should be renovated, and counted on their ace
in the hole - Henry Gonzalez' oversight of the Frost-Leland Amendment preventing the use of
federal funds to demolish any part of Allen Parkway Village.
The residents began to craft their own master plan, which would use the HOPE VI funds
to create a new Allen Parkway Village. The residents envisioned graduate students from area
universities and service providers living together with elderly residents and low-income families
in a Community Campus. The students would help to provide needed human services, such as
medical care, child-care and job training, in exchange for rent subsidies. 80 HUD Secretary
Cisneros and Resident Council President Lenwood Johnson endorsed the community campus
concept in a document entitled "Guiding Pricipals, Stakes in the Ground." The guiding
principals reiterated the prohibition against selling any of the Allen Parkway Village site, but it
also left open the possibility for demolition, which would be determined by planning teams.
The document also pledged one-for-one replacement with hard units, rather than portable
vouchers.81
The consensus reached with the "Stakes in the Ground" document survived only a short
while. The residents refused to work with HUD and the Housing Authority on the planning
80 Testimony of Catherine M. Roberts to U. S. House Subcomittee on Housing and Community
Development, Allen Parkway Community Campus.
81 Guiding Principals document, signed by Lenwood Johnson, Henry Cisneros and Congresswoman
Sheila Jackson Lee on March 22, 1996. Courtesy of Lenwood Johnson.
process until HUD released a $300,000 grant allocated to the residents. The grant was meant
to ensure the residents' ability to negotiate on an equal footing with the Housing Authority.
Once again, the residents and the Housing Authority officials were at loggerheads, unable to
work together.
The Housing Authority proceeded to create its own master plan without the residents'
involvement. The City Council approved the Housing Authority's application to demolish,
despite a raucous demonstration and pleadings by the residents and many others, to hold off.
The vote set demolition in motion before the Housing Authority had finished its master plan,
and crushed the residents' dreams of creating their community campus. In moving to demolish
Allen Parkway Village before a replacement plan existed, the Housing Authority and the City
Council reinforced the residents' belief the Housing Authority's primary goal was to demolish
Allen Parkway Village.
By March 1996, the Housing Authority had gained approval from the Advisory Council
on Historic Preservation, the Texas Historical Commission, HUD and the Housing Authority of
the City of Houston (HACH) for its plan to renovate 286 units and to demolish the rest. The
residents continued to work on their own plan and to insist that demolition would be illegal.
Indefatigable Resident Council President Lenwood Johnson remarked, "community effort has
stopped four other [HACH] demolition applications. There's no reason to think that community
effort can't stop this one."8 2
For the first time, however, Lenwood Johnson was wrong about the community's ability
to stop the demolition. The residents and city officials never negotiated a compromise solution.
Instead, the issue was resolved, as were so many with respect to Allen Parkway Village and
Freedmen's Town, on the federal level. With the Democrats' loss of control of the United States
House of Representatives in 1994, the residents' most powerful ally, Henry Gonzalez, lost the
chair of the Banking Finance and Urban Affairs Committee. In short order, Congressman Tom
Delay (R-Houston) successfully orchestrated the repeal of the Frost-Leland Amendment, leaving
the Housing Authority with the power to demolish Allen Parkway Village. One month after
Congress repealed Frost-Leland in June of 1996, the Housing Authority evicted the remaining
tenants and proceeded to demolish Allen Parkway Village.8 3
Lanier's HOPE VI strategy succeeded where others had failed because HUD became a
central character in the dispute. In prior efforts to demolish Allen Parkway Village, HUD was
sometimes slightly in favor of demolition (during the Reagan era) and sometimes in favor of
preservation (Carter era) but ultimately bowed to the courts and the local actors to work out
the dispute. With the new HOPE VI program, however, HUD had become committed to
demolition, and therefore insisted on moving the process forward. While the residents did
receive major concessions, insofar as the site would be preserved for affordable housing and
not sold, still HUD's HOPE VI program allowed the mayor to carry out his agenda of
demolishing Allen Parkway Village.
Evaluating HOPE VI
HOPE VI grew out of the recommendations of a national commission on distressed
public housing. The commission discovered that only a small percentage of public housing
developments fit the description of severely distressed and recommended massive
transformations of both the physical design and the human services offered at these
developments. Changes in the design of the public housing would allow for lower densities,
more congruence with surrounding neighborhoods and greater opportunities to integrate the
development into a larger community. Congress allocated billions to HUD to fund the
innovative HOPE VI program, designed to reinvent the most distressed public housing and
concomitantly to change the public's opinion about subsidized housing on the whole.
The residents of Allen Parkway Village agreed that their home qualified as distressed but
differed fundamentally with HUD's analysis of the cause of the distress. Physical design and
high densities of people did not explain Allen Parkway Village's decline. Nor did the residents
suffer from isolation from the larger community but had in fact marshaled the support of
82 Gerald Moorhead, "The Final Days," Preservation News. March/April 1996.
83 "Moving Day," Houston Chronicle June 13, 1996.
Freedmen's Town residents, who believed that the presence of Allen Parkway Village enhanced
their community. Rather, the Housing Authority's consistent neglect of maintenance, the
intentional depopulation and the ongoing belief that the value of the land should determine
who could live in the shadow of downtown combined to cause the severe distress of Allen
Parkway Village. Residents believed that the remedy for the distress lay in renovating the
units, and developing a political commitment to the tenure of public housing residents living
once again in large numbers on the valuable land.84
Ironically, the residents' most ardent defenders, Resident Council President Lenwood
Johnson and Chairman of the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee Henry
Gonzalez, both had a hand in the creation of HOPE VI. Gonzalez helped to create the original
commission on severely distressed public housing, committed his considerable political capital
to funding the commission's recommendations, and sponsored the appointment of Lenwood
Johnson to the commission. Both men continued to disagree with HUD and the Housing
Authority that Allen Parkway Village fit into the paradigm of poorly designed public housing.
Political agendas had created the problems at Allen Parkway Village, not a flaw in the physical
design. Though the residents did not object to the large grant per se, in that they believed the
money could be well spent in repairing Allen Parkway Village, the HOPE VI grant came with the
presumption that the buildings would mostly be demolished.
Houston received a HOPE VI grant not only because Allen Parkway Village had
deteriorated but also because the Secretary of HUD owed Houston's Mayor a favor. Even
though Cisneros prevented Lanier from selling the land outright, the grant did allow the Mayor
to achieve a personal goal of ridding the city of Allen Parkway Village and of making Freedmen's
Town hospitable to middle income development.
In an audit of the HOPE VI program the General Accounting Office (GAO) found that
other grants had been made in a similar manner. GAO reported that HUD granted $381
million to 37 ineligible applicants, and "as a result, the Department assumed increased risks of
primarily benefitting local organizational priorities, in a subordinate manner to the national
84 Interview Lenwood Johnson
goals."85 The report also found widespread demolition of viable units, and that the needs of the
public housing residents and those in surrounding neighborhoods were not being met, or even
addressed by the applicants.




Once HUD finally approved the demolition of Allen Parkway Village, Mayor Bob Lanier
lost no time in turning his attention to the surrounding Fourth Ward. As ever, the news of the
demise of the public housing development raised prospects for high-end redevelopment of the
neighboring Fourth Ward. In light of the City's failed 1980s attempt to broker a deal between
the landowners and prospective developers, Lanier took a different tack. In 1994 he facilitated
the creation of a non-profit, Houston Renaissance, that would direct the redevelopment of the
Fourth Ward. Although dubbed a private non-profit, Houston Renaissance operated strictly
with public funds targeted for affordable housing and spent in excess of $10 million dollars to
acquire properties throughout the Fourth Ward. Along with the public funds came the
stipulation that Houston Renaissance build at least 250 units of affordable housing in the
neighborhood.
Thus the City of Houston, through its vehicle Houston Renaissance, attempted a highly
unusual strategy for redevelopment of a distressed area: outright purchasing of the
neighborhood. Barred from using more traditional methods of shaping or targeting
development, such as zoning, and smart enough to avoid using eminent domain, which is a
form of political suicide in Houston, the Mayor in effect acted as a private developer would by
purchasing the land piece by piece.
Although the City charged the non-profit to acquire land and to implement a master
plan for its redevelopment, Houston Renaissance spent all of the public funds on land
acquisition. The organization dissolved because the public funding ran dry and because of the
Attorney General's investigation into deceptive trade practices. At its demise, Houston
Renaissance had succeeded in acquiring over one million square feet of land, but had not built
a single unit of housing. Title to the properties, which together comprised at least one-quarter
of Freedmen's Town, passed to the City. Unfortunately, while the Mayor chose agents capable
of assembling land, the organization itself never built the requisite credibility either with the
dwindling Freedmen's Town residents or with private lenders or philanthropists to rebuild the
neighborhood.
Even though Houston Renaissance never built any housing, the rapid acquisition of
property initiated a series of evictions, as landlords prepared to sell their properties, and
private sector developers purchased and razed houses, in anticipation of the neighborhood's
gentrification. The rate of evictions sped up once title to the properties passed to the City,
which preferred to raze properties than to act as a landlord, even though the implementation of
Houston Renaissance's master plan remains unlikely.
Creation of Houston Renaissance
Both of Bob Lanier's immediate predecessors had eyed the redevelopment of the Fourth
Ward and had tried to assist interested developers by urging the Housing Authority to demolish
Allen Parkway Village. Those efforts failed as did private sector efforts, such as Founder's Park.
Like his predecessors, Lanier sought to turn around the ailing area; during his mayoral
campaign he even accused prior Mayor Kathy Whitmire of abandoning the people of the Fourth
Ward. 86 Lanier, a former real estate developer, sought to succeed where his predecessors had
failed by taking the lead in the redevelopment, rather than working for a particular developer.
Within his first two years in office, he scored a victory that had eluded Houston's mayors for
nearly two decades: the approval from HUD, via the HOPE VI program, to redevelop Allen
Parkway Village. Next, he sought to take control of the rest of the Fourth Ward.
In addition to HUD's approval of Houston's HOPE VI application to remake Allen
Parkway Village, Lanier was working within another important context: the defeat in 1993 of a
citywide referendum proposing to adopt zoning. Although Houston's voters had rejected zoning
on several prior occasions, pro-zoning advocates thought they had amassed enough support to
win the 1993 referendum. During the last few months before the vote, however, a unusual and
highly effective coalition of opponents to zoning emerged to winnow away the pro-zoning vote,
and they ultimately defeated the proposed zoning ordinance by a few percentage points. The
most vocal opponent, property rights activist Barry Klein, relentlessly disseminated a vision of
zoning that impinged on property rights, enriched developers and created unwieldy and
expensive bureaucracies. Klein's powerful message created momentum, but the anti-zoning
forces needed help to solidify their lead. The leader of the anti-zoning crusade, Julio Laguarta,
approached Bill Calhoun, a well known African American businessman, and convinced him
that minority entrepreneurs would be especially injured by zoning, which would restrict home
business operations. Calhoun appealed to other leaders in the African American community,
especially ministers, and convinced them. 87 The ministers' endorsement of the anti-zoning
crusade, along with the African American communities remembrance of the proposed racially
based zoning ordinances of 1929, contributed to the large percentage of African Americans who
voted against zoning and turned the tide against the zoning advocates. Another important last-
minute zoning opponent was architect Frank Kelly, an initial supporter of the measure, who
argued that political compromise had so watered down the proposed ordinance that it was
useless.
Even though Lanier was a weak supporter, at best, of the proposed ordinance, zoning
would have given Lanier one tool that his predecessors lacked to encourage redevelopment in
the Fourth Ward. After its defeat, he approached the anti-zoning activists and asked them to
propose an alternative vision for sparking redevelopment of distressed inner city
neighborhoods. Houston Renaissance thus was born, and counted a high percentage of anti-
zoning crusaders, such as Julio Laguarta, Frank Kelly, and Bill Calhoun, on its board of
directors.88
86 Alan Bernstein, "Lanier says Fourth Ward policy failure," Houston Chronicle, September 26, 1991
87 Siegan, Bernard H. Land Use Without Zoning. Houston: Bartholdi and Lazarus. 1993. Chapter 10
discusses the relationship of zoning to segregation, a very powerful argument for minorities to oppose
zoning. See also Silver, Twentieth Century Richmond, pp 109-113 for the use of zoning to control black
residential patterns in Richmond.
88 Press coverage of Houson Renaissance's origins generally attribute the idea to Bob Lanier, and his
housing advisor, Michael Stevens, who approached Julio Laguarta. Interviews suggest that the idea came
The Acquisition Phase
Charged with redeveloping the Fourth Ward, the newly formed organization sought first
to acquire land in the neighborhood, and then to sponsor a master planning process for the
redevelopment. Houston Housing Finance Agency, a conduit for Fannie Mae affordable housing
funds that was headed by Lanier advisor Michael Stevens, loaned $3.4 million to Houston
Renaissance to start acquiring land in 1995. Houston Renaissance director Julio Laguarta
went on a shopping spree, acquiring more than one million square feet of land within a year.
Laguarta faced two daunting challenges in acquiring Fourth Ward land: clarifying
ownership despite the murky title issues resulting from generations of family ownership and
informal building practices and reaching agreement of sales price without causing a speculative
run up of land. A group of Italian American families had controlled much of the land in the
Fourth Ward for decades. In some cases, families traced their ownership back to the 1920s,
when their immigrant ancestors first bought property. Few of the properties were encumbered
by mortgages, nor had many passed through other conventional legal processes, such as title
searches, associated with the transfer of property. The deed records in some cases did not
register changes in ownership since the 1920s, as successive generations inherited property
without issuing deeds. For Houston Renaissance, establishing ownership proved difficult.
Indeed, controversies over ownership of Fourth Ward land are still surfacing. 89
Apart from the question of who owned Fourth Ward land Laguarta faced numerous
entanglements over property lines. All of the buildings in the 80-block district targeted by
Houston Renaissance were built before 1935, long before the city required any permits for
buildings. 90 As a result the neighborhood grew very informally, with additions put on, and extra
buildings squeezed onto lots. The separation between property boundaries, never particularly
rigid, blurred over time. Houston Renaissance enjoyed the advantage of seeking to acquire all
out of a series of conversations between the Mayor and the cadre of anti-zoning activists. See Houston
Chronicle "New Era for Fourth Ward" October 4, 1998 and Interview with Bill Calhoun.
89 For discussions of title problems in the Fourth Ward see: Houston Press, September 10, 1998, Houston
Chronicle, October 4, 1998 and December 30, 1998 and Harris County Registry of Deeds, Volume 3814
Page 3822 for affidavits of ownership.
the property in the neighborhood, which would obviate much concern over original property
boundaries. Still, establishing ownership created more headaches in the Fourth Ward than in
neighborhoods that had experienced more transformations.
The need to dampen a speculative atmosphere required finesse. Few landlords,
encumbered by properties that generated too little income to pay property taxes, could resist
hoping that the City's deep-pocketed agents would finally deliver the long expected payoff on
their Fourth Ward holdings. Houston Renaissance, however, sought to pay as little as possible
for the land. When in 1984 a confederation of landlords signed a Memorandum of Agreement
with the City, the group set a minimum price of $20 per square foot. Twelve years later,
Houston Renaissance offered only $5 per square foot. Although some landlords willingly
accepted the low price, others assumed that the city, or other eager developers, would pay more
to the holdouts. To convince the holdouts, Laguarta called on his long history of relationships
with area property owners. 9 1 Frances Corso Quartaro, a vocal property owner whose family
had owned land in the neighborhood for several generations, wrote a letter to the uncooperative
landlords, urging them to accept $5 per square foot. She explained that Houston Renaissance
would not buy any land in the Fourth Ward, and would cancel existing contracts to purchase
land, if the organization could not count on participation from a majority of landowners. 92
Laguarta, through Quartaro, convinced many of the landowners who remembered the
disappointment of the 1980s, when every development that was heralded as a sure thing
evaporated, leaving them with unprofitable properties. 93
For those land owners who remained unswayed by Quartaro's argument, Laguarta
threatened a worse outcome. The City itself had invested so much in Houston Renaissance's
acquisition of property; if the proposed redevelopment were threatened by the resistance of
90 Houston did not establish a building code until the 1970s, and only because the Model Cities program
would not allocated funds to cities without a building code.
91 Laguarta's relationship with the Fourth Ward dates to at least 1979, when he advised Mayor McConn
about the redevelopment of the neighborhood.
92 Houston Press, April 4, 1997.
93 1n 1979, when consultants hired by the city first explored city-sponsored redevelopment of the Fourth
Ward, going prices in the neighborhood ranged from $8 to $20 per square foot. In the 1950s when Cullen
property owners looking to profit unreasonably, the City could be convinced to use eminent
domain to acquire the needed land. The price paid then, Laguarta warned, surely would not
exceed $5 per square foot and might in fact be less.94 Ultimately, Laguarta convinced enough
of the landowners to sell that Houston Renaissance was able to acquire more than one million
square feet of Freedmen's Town land for approximately $5 per square foot.9 5 The method that
the zealous opponent of zoning used was to threaten the landlords with eminent domain in
order to gain control of the entire neighborhood. Thus, Laguarta came to believe that the
Houston Renaissance project to reshape Freedmen's Town was more important than his
ideologies about zoning.
The property owners, many of whom had owned land in Freedmen's Town for decades,
did not realize a huge profit on their holdings. Many were simply relieved to be out of the
business of owning run down rental properties whose historical and emotional significance for
their tenants and others created a tense and complicated situation.
Planning
In acquiring a substantial proportion of the Fourth Ward, Houston Renaissance
achieved much more than any prior redevelopment effort and, by dint of a $10 million bankroll
from the City, had acquired the land by 1996, after only two years of existence. By 1997,
however, the organization had stalled. No new land had been acquired, no houses had been
built and, most seriously, no private entities had been enticed to join the enterprise. The
Houston Housing Finance Agency, a quasi-public agency that had lent Houston Renaissance
more than $6 million, with the expectation that the sale of the new units of affordable housing
in the neighborhood would repay the loan, pressured Houston Renaissance for action. An
alliance of ministers, representing not only the interests of neighborhood residents but also
Center acquired blocks of Freedmen's Town land closer to downtown, sales prices were about $3 per
square foot. See interview with Saverio Giammalva.
94 Houston Press April 3, 1997.
95 Houston Press July 31, 1997
their own interests as landowners, complained that the community had been left out of
Houston Renaissance's plans.
Houston Renaissance responded to these pressures by hiring, upon the
recommendation of the ministerial alliance, the high profile, Boston-based planning firm, Stull
& Lee.9 6 Architect and urban planner David Lee brought extensive experience working within
sensitive, highly contested urban neighborhoods. Introducing himself to the community with
an open meeting, held at Antioch Baptist Church in July, 1997, Lee was cordially received by
the residents in attendance. He faced, however, a demoralized group. By 1997 barely 350
residents remained in Freedmen's Town, and many had given up hope of reversing the decay
and displacement that had steadily depleted their numbers. 97 Other participants at the
meeting included Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, and the executive director of Central
Houston, a partnership of downtown business people.98
Lee addressed himself to the residents, whom he hoped would be part of the planning
process, assuring them that he intended to incorporate as much of the neighborhood as
possible. Despite his conviction, the residents remained skeptical. Jacquelyn Beckham, a
neighborhood resident for more than thirty years and a homeowner, patiently explained
Mr. Lee, you've stated and restated how you're new to the issue. Well, I can tell you,
this is nothing but the same old stuff. We've been here again and again and again. If
the developers had any love for our community, they'd have come to us long ago. 99
As for Lee's assertion that redevelopment could accommodate all kinds of people, at all levels of
income, seventy year old resident of the Fourth Ward Lucinda Campbell reasoned "It's no
longer convenient for people to live in the suburbs, but maybe those people don't want to live
next door to me."100
96 Interview Josh Hill
97 Houston Press July 3, 1997
98 Central Houston had expressed preferences for a higher income residential neighborhood to replace the
Fourth Ward. A brochure from this era shows a downtown area map in which Freedmen's Town in
marked "new residential" Interview Barry Klein.
99 Houston Press, July 31, 1997
100 Houston Press, July 31, 1997.
The plan that David Lee produced under a tight six-week deadline respected many of
the historical characteristics of Freedmen's Town and tried to accommodate existing residents
into the new neighborhood. Lee achieved a measure of community consensus on his detailed
plan, which envisioned the development of 2000 units, over 100 acres. Because Houston
Renaissance only controlled approximately 26 acres, and in a disjointed array, the organization
was not able to implement the plan without further resources.10 1
Houston Renaissance's board of directors hoped to get some immediate benefits from
the document by shopping the new plan around to banks, foundations, and even real estate
investment trusts (REITS) in hopes of funding its implementation. Banks declined to extend a
revolving line of credit, foundations passed and, although some real estate development
companies expressed an interest in taking over the operation, and promised to complete the
requisite number of affordable units, the board of Houston Renaissance was not yet ready to
give up control.
The primary result of the new plan was a wave of evictions, as property owners prepared
to sell to other, private developers that began moving in on Freedmen's Town land. 0
2 Around
Thanksgiving, word spread that the REIT that had remade Dallas' equivalent of Freedmen's
Town into a high-end townhome community had expressed interest in Houston Renaissance,
causing panic to set in among remaining residents. At least 42 families were evicted, including
one 77 year woman, Willie Taylor, who had to leave her home of 50 years, in the neighborhood
that her ancestors had helped to build. 0 3
Partnering with the Housing Authority
While the Dallas-based REIT failed to join the Houston Renaissance team, the Housing
Authority, flush with a new $21 million grant from HUD to revitalize Freedmen's Town, joined
101 Houston Chronicle, October 4, 1998
102 Perry Homes, a development company specializing in building luxury townhomes in close-in
neighborhoods purchased at least 12 lots during this period. See Harris County Registry of Deeds
103 Houston Press. November 13, 1997
forces with Renaissance Houston. The Housing Authority had decided to replace some 250
units of Allen Parkway Village housing within Freedmen's Town and elected to work within
Houston Renaissance's plan. Houston Renaissance then appealed to the City Council to reduce
its affordable housing burden, from 250 to 150 units, arguing that the Housing Authority's
replacement units would provide affordable housing. The City Council agreed to the reduction
without requiring Houston Renaissance to return any of the money granted to the organization
to create affordable housing.104
Neighborhood residents complained about the tactic, pointing out that Freedmen's Town
residents could not afford HUD's replacement housing, which targeted the high end of the
moderate-income market. The new HUD houses would sell for over $100,000. Even with deep
subsidies, no resident of Freedmen's Town or of Allen Parkway Village could afford the
'replacement' housing. Housing Authority Executive Director Joy Fitzgerald defended the
program, saying "It's just the direction HUD is going in these days. There's just not enough
money to build and maintain housing for people who would only pay two dollars a month in
rent. " 105 Houston Renaissance thus did not plan to re-house the displaced residents, and it
chose to use city rather than federal money so that the organization would be under no legal
obligation pay displacement costs. The federal Uniform Relocation Act requires that projects
using federal funds pay the moving costs and rent differentials for displaced tenants. Mayoral
Advisor Michael Stevens explicitly considered these costs burdensome and sought to avoid
compliance with the Uniform Relocation Act by using proceeds from a City of Houston
affordable housing bond, rather than available federal monies, for the Houston Renaissance
project.106
104 Houston Chronicle, October 21, 1997
105 Houston Press, July 31, 1997. Note that actual rents were much greater than two dollars per month.
106 Houston Press, February 11, 1998 reported the following comments from Stevens in the City Council
Minutes: "Compliance with the Uniform Relocation Act would cost an estimated $2.9 million and would
require giving a series of potentially troublesome notices to all of the landowners and tenants in the
Fourth Ward.. .As a result [hired a lawfirml to seek waivers from [hud] with respect to certain of such
notices." When they didn't get the waivers, Stevens turned down 2.1 million from HUD. City Council then
Scandals and Set-backs
As Bob Lanier looked toward retirement as Mayor at the end of 1997, he could claim
some successes in the Fourth Ward that had eluded his predecessors. The Housing Authority
was knocking down Allen Parkway Village and the City had taken control of a large chunk of
Freedmen's Town, which would be rebuilt with mostly middle to high-income residences and
some affordable housing. Freedmen's Town residents hoped that his successor, Houston's first
African American Mayor Lee Brown, would demonstrate more sensitivity to the plight of the
residents who would be evicted from their homes.
Brown, who had enjoyed Lanier's strong endorsement, steered clear of the Freedmen's
Town issue for a while, supporting neither the residents nor the Housing Authority. During the
summer of 1998, criticism of Houston Renaissance continued to build. The ministerial
alliance, which had advocated and helped to fund David Lee's consensus building planning
process, complained that they had been left out of any further decision-making. Houston
Renaissance had still not built a single unit of housing and had run out of public funding.
Critics wondered what exactly the $10 million had purchased for Houston's citizens.
Brown expressed concern over the exclusion of the ministers, and the community they
represented, from the Houston Renaissance program. He worried publicly that Houston
Renaissance had used the ministers to pay lip-service to the idea of a partnership with the
community but had continued to make decisions without taking the community into
consideration. Brown worried: "my uneasiness and concern [was] that there either was or was
not a partnership. They were telling me that, well, the coalition brought no money to the table.
But what the coalition brought to the table was a community in order for them to get their
money." Houston Renaissance responded quickly with an offer to give the ministerial alliance
an option to purchase 100,000 square feet of land for affordable housing development.' 0 7
Board members of Houston Renaissance approached Brown, hat in hand, to assist them
in dredging up more money. Banks had refused to lend money to the organization, yet again.
approved 3.4 million from affordable housing bond (to reimburse HHFC for money already lent to
purchase Fourth Ward land).
If the city would agree to subordinate its claim on Houston Renaissance's holdings, lenders
might agree to loan money. Brown refused, arguing that the subordination would allow banks
to repossess the property should Houston Renaissance default on its loan and that the bank
would not be required to build affordable housing. Mayor Brown's wariness of Houston
Renaissance's ability to pay its debts stemmed not only from the organization's track record of
seeking new city grants to replace debt, but also from increasing signs of fiscal trouble within
the organization. Under mounting pressure to investigate, Brown ordered an audit of Houston
Renaissance. He believed that the organization's directors had not fundamentally abused the
public's trust but had perhaps approached the discharge of funds with less rigor than is usual
for a publicly funded enterprise.
Critics argued that Houston Renaissance directors and consultants earned salaries that
were unreasonable for employees of a publicly funded non-profit dedicated to expanding
affordable housing options. Julio Laguarta, for example, had collected $369,000 in salary, and
looked forward to making a commission on each Fourth Ward transaction he brokered, which
could add an additional $400,000. Executive Director Robert Boyd, who commuted from
Florida for much of the time that he ran the organization, collected as much as $262,000 in a
twelve month period.10 8
Brown expressed confidence, however, that the audit would reveal no major
irregularities and that Laguarta had performed a Herculean task in amassing as much of the
Fourth Ward as he did. Furthermore, Laguarta had undertaken a new strategy crucial to the
success of Houston Renaissance. During the Fall of 1998, Laguarta lobbied land owners in the
Fourth Ward to support the creation of a Tax Incremenent Reinvestment Zone (TIRZ) district, in
principle a very similar proposal to the Tax Increment Finance (TIF) district unsuccessfully
proposed by the Founder's Park group in 1990. The TIRZ district would allow the city to pay
for development in the Fourth Ward now, by issuing bonds based on the districts increased
future valuation, and would allow Houston Renaissance to impose some land use controls on
107 Houston Press, October 4, 1998.
108 Houston Press, October 4, 1998.
the area. The TIRZ district would thus give Houston Renaissance additional clout with bankers
and developers, who would be more likely to fund the development with the TIRZ districts'
assured stream of revenue and the land use controls to implement the plan. Mayor Brown and
other members of the Houston Renaissance board defended Laguarta's well-paid role in the
organization, arguing that no-one else could have marshaled as many signatures in support of
the desperately needed TIRZ district as Laguarta.
Crisis in Public Confidence
The Houston Housing Finance Agency refused to lend any more money to Houston
Renaissance until the organization had more disciplined leadership and had its finances in
order. Despite Houston Renaissance's endorsement of LaGuarta's activities, the organization
heeded the Houston Housing Finance Agency's recommendations. In September, Houston
Renaissance announced that developer and former head of the Greater Houston Partnership's
Chamber of Commerce John Walsh would take over as Executive Director, in an atmosphere
that a city councilor described as a "crisis in public confidence."10 9
Walsh found Houston Renaissance in considerable disarray, financially and
organizationally. He vowed to straighten out the finances and to ensure that the TIRZ district
petition would pass the City Council's review. Walsh also had his eye on the Attorney General's
brewing interest in investigating Houston Renaissance's practice of spending public money
without a public vote. In what may have been the most serious challenge to Houston
Renaissance's continued existence, property rights activist Barry Klein resurfaced, insisting
that the proposed TIRZ district was in fact zoning in disguise and claiming that Laguarta had
collected invalid signatures for the petition.
Two announcements in December, 1998 signaled the demise of Houston Renaissance.
The Texas Attorney General's office announced an investigation into Houston Renaissance,
whose practice of spending public money without an open public vote violated the Deceptive
109 Houston Chronicle, October 4, 1998.
Trade Practices Act." 0 Meanwhile, Barry Klein announced that he had acquired enough
rescission statements from Fourth Ward land owners, who had changed their minds about the
TIRZ district upon discovering that the city could choose to grant the TIRZ district board of
directors the power of eminent domain. Klein further pointed out that, when Houston voters
turned down the zoning proposal, they also voted to require the city to put any future land use
controls to a citywide referendum, which had not happened for the Houston Renaissance TIRZ
district proposal."' Thus the brainchild of a group of anti-zoning activists foundered
eventually on the zoning issue, as Houston Renaissance's board members came to believe that
the redevelopment could not be successful without land use controls. Their desire to remake
Freedmen's Town overrode their ideological opposition to zoning. Their defeat of zoning in 1993
made the institution of any land use controls very difficult, subject to a citywide referendum as
well as the scrutiny of other zoning opponents.
The Demise of Houston Renaissance
Though it would take another few months for Houston Renaissance to sign over its
holdings to the city, the Attorney General's probe, Barry Klein's attack against the TIRZ district,
and the ongoing audit of the organization's finance effectively killed the organization. Executive
Director John Walsh resigned in February, after the audit showed violations in the handling of
the $3.4 million city grant. Although the contract prohibited Houston Renaissance board
members, employees and directors from profiting from the redevelopment of the Fourth Ward,
Houston Renaissance had made payments to people, such as Julio Laguarta, in violation of the
contract. Other questionable actions included incurring penalties for making late property tax
payments and losing the original application, a sign, according to the auditor, of Houston
Renaissance's lack of diligence in compliance.ii 2
Houston Renaissance consisted then of an empty bank account, 1.2 million square feet
of Freedmen's Town land, much of which had been cleared of houses and residents, a
110 Houston Chronicle, December 19, 1998
111 Interview with Barry Klein and Houston Chronicle November 24, 1998.
redevelopment plan, and mounting legal problems. Walsh resigned assuming that Houston
Renaissance would transfer title to the properties over to the city and then dissolve. The
Attorney General's office announced that the probe of Houston Renaissance would continue,
despite the organization's demise.
The Mayor's office insisted that the Fourth Ward redevelopment project could still be
resolved successfully. Lee Brown insisted that he "feel[s] very good about where we'll end up.
We will follow through on the city's commitment to create affordable housing"1 13
Lessons learned
Houston Renaissance proved, through its failure, the difficulty of
implementing a comprehensive plan to direct the development of one of Houston's urban
neighborhoods. The directors of Houston Renaissance came to believe that some kind of land
use controls, such as a TIRZ district would provide, were necessary for the organization to be
able to shape the neighborhood. Simply purchasing much of the land did not, in the end, give
Houston Renaissance the leverage it needed to complete the master plan. The need to bring in
planners from as far away as Boston to lead a planning process also highlights the lack of a
local constituency for planning.
To overcome the difficulties of planning in Houston, an organization would have to be
much more efficient and well managed than Houston Renaissance. The inflated salaries and
lack of oversight contributed to the inability of Houston Renaissance to gain any measure of
credibility within the Houston community.
The Houston community itself, both the leadership in Freedmen's Town and in City
Hall, failed to protect the interests of Freedmen's Town residents, as hundreds of people lost
112 Houston Chronicle, February 8, 1999, February 18, 1999 and March 2, 1999.
113 Houston Chronicle. March 6, 1999
their homes in a taxpayer-funded takeover, which eliminated affordable housing without
building any replacement.
Part I Conclusion
City Hall sits on land once part of Freedmen's Town. From the mayor's office, only the
interstate highway separates Freedmen's Town from downtown. Houston's mayors might have
sided with the Freedmen's Town residents. They might have walked under the highway
overpass and looked at the world from that side of the highway. Instead, four successive
mayors looked at Freedmen's Town in the same way as downtown businessmen and developers
saw it: a struggling, outdated, poor, embarrassing slum.
Thus in a city whose voters rejected zoning because they were ideologically opposed to
government intervention in land use decisions, four successive mayors plotted to control the
development of Freedmen's Town. In order to unleash the market forces that were believed to
be inevitably poised to assimilate Freedmen's Town into downtown, Houston's mayors devised
an array of government-funded interventions. They used city affordable housing bonds to
purchase and demolish Freedmen's Town residences, manipulated HUD funds to demolish
Allen Parkway Village, and used the city's affordable housing finance agency as a slush fund for
public/private ventures. The city also intervened by refusing to spend money allocated for
Freedmen's Town, such as grants to repair Allen Parkway Village, Community Development
Block Grant (CDBG) funds, and infrastructure improvements.
In light of the failure of the development community to understand the wild real estate
market cycle in Houston, the mayors' commitment to serve development interests, and to treat
the developers as wiser than the Freedmen's Town residents constitutes a grave failure of
responsibility. Although Freedmen's Town undoubtedly sits on highly desirable land, private
development was not forthcoming even though the city used its money and power to pave the
way. Meanwhile the residents were ill served.
Given the array of powerful forces committed to redeveloping Freedmen's Town, why
were the various efforts so unsuccessful? How did the residents manage to fend off
development for as long as they did? The next section discusses the residents' multiple
strategies to control the fate of their community.
PART TWO: THE RESIDENTS' STRATEGIES
Introduction
The Freedmen's Town residents seemed powerless to forestall development: they did not
own land, marshaling a constituency for public housing hard was difficult, and they were
dealing with a city where developing land to its highest and best use is a sacred act.
Nonetheless, they fought tooth and nail against the city's various attempts to redevelop their
neighborhood. In opposing the powerful forces arrayed to wipe out Freedmen's Town, the
residents were fighting against extinction but were also fighting an ideological battle. To
survive, they would have to convince a number of people that their community - its history, its
people and its structures-was more important than the more lucrative development that could
replace it. They fought this battle of beliefs in the trenches, using any method that might gain
them some more time in Freedmen's Town. The residents sought historic preservation status
for their community, launched a plethora of lawsuits to constrain the Housing Authority, and
enlisted supporters from outside the neighborhood to broaden the constituency for their
survival. Ultimately their success would rest on whether the political culture could change and
accept the presence of poor, minority people living in public housing or in run-down homes in
the shadows of downtown.
The following chapters detail the residents' primary strategies: litigation, leverage and
historic preservation. Unlike the city's strategies, which tended to be chronological, the




At the turn of the century, the Fourth Ward extended to the geographical heart of
Houston. By 1978, municipal structures and corporate towers had replaced most of the
original Fourth Ward buildings on the downtown side of the highway. One of the last extant
buildings from the old Fourth Ward on that side of the highway was also one of the most
important. Founded in 1869, Antioch Baptist Church, the oldest and most prestigious
historically black congregation in the city, occupied the same building designed in 1875 by
African American architect and former slave Richard Allen. 1 14 The congregation was under
tremendous pressure to sell to nearby Cullen Center, a multi-tower office complex wedged
around the old church. Led by the founder's great-granddaughter, the congregation opted not
to sell, leaving the church now completely surrounded by glassy office towers. The process of
galvanizing the congregation to defend its important legacy led to the successful application of
Antioch Baptist to the National Register of Historic Places, the first such listing of a Fourth
Ward structure.115
The advocates for the preservation of Antioch Baptist Church appealed to a prosperous
and influential congregation, which had cherished and maintained the Church building since
1875. Advocates for the preservation of the rest of Fourth Ward, comprised mostly of run down
rental buildings on the other side of the highway, faced a tougher battle.
Freedmen's Town Historic District
In 1980, the City Council sponsored a feasibility study of redevelopment options for the
Fourth Ward that described the neighborhood as "obsolete." The consultants suggested that
the highest and best use for the land in the neighborhood would be higher density residential.
114 Texas Trailblazer Series 2, No.5 Richard Allen.
115 Afro-American Collection, Metropolitan Research Center. Antioch Missionary Baptist Church of
Christ.
The report identified Allen Parkway Village as the most appealing land for this purpose but
included all of Freedmen's Town in its recommendations. Successful redevelopment would
require overcoming the stigma of the area, especially the blighting influence of Allen Parkway
Village, which was run down and populated by poor, mostly African-American tenants. The
study acknowledged that city officials were concerned that the current residents be treated
fairly, yet the proposal presupposed displacement of the residents and recommended the
destruction of most of the urban fabric in order to overcome the neighborhood's negative
image.11 6 Belying the apparent stigma attached to living in the Fourth Ward, the report noted a
"high degree of social cohesion in the Fourth Ward and a strong desire on the part of many
residents to remain there." Furthermore, fewer than three percent of residential units in
Freedmen's Town were estimated to be vacant. The authors concluded that even though people
seemed to like living in their neighborhood and that the landlords had no trouble finding
tenants, the residents would be happier if the whole area were razed and they could return to
live in newly constructed housing." 7
Freedmen's Town ministers and black business people joined residents in decrying the
report's findings. The group was particularly scandalized by the study's claim that more than
half the residents interviewed would leave their homes if they could. The report recommended
placing Freedmen's Town residents into federally subsidized housing, which had not yet been
built. Residents did not believe that the Housing Authority would be able to build any new
public housing, and they wondered how a new development would be any less of a blight than
Allen Parkway Village. Residents and ministers concluded that the City had 'Joined forces with
developers."118
In response to this report of obsolescence and to the outrage of the neighborhood's
residents, a group of Fourth Ward ministers and black business people proposed the creation of
an historic district which would preserve some of Freedmen's Town. Al Calloway, Vice
president of the Houston Citizens Chamber of Commerce, proposed a fifteen block district that
116 Economics Research Associates, Working Paper. October 1, 1979.
117 ERA report, page 20.
would preserve the history of Freedmen's Town while housing some current residents.119 New,
private development could then be directed outside of the district. The group's proposal offered
a compromise that would allow much of the development proposed in the ERA report while
preserving some of the neighborhood for its residents and for posterity.
Paralyzed by the outcry from the neighborhood, the City Council did not immediately
pursue the ERA report's recommendations for redevelopment. Nor did it seriously consider the
residents' coalition proposal. Rather, the City Council's primary reaction to this report seems
to have been to delay action - no infrastructure improvements, no spending of the $10 million
rehabilitation grant allocated by HUD to renovate APV, no CDBG allocations for this district,
deemed too far gone for these funds, no building permits issued. When, in 1983, the City
Council sponsored another report, again recommending the demolition and redevelopment of
Allen Parkway Village and the Fourth Ward, the residents were prepared. 120
In 1984, Freedmen's Town residents nominated forty blocks of their community to the
National Register of Historic Places. The residents wanted not only to acknowledge the crucial
importance of their community but also to acquire some defense against increasing pressure
from downtown business interests and city hall to redevelop the area. Freedmen's Town
Association, which was formed in 1981 to organize residents and to advocate for development
sensitive to both the neighborhood's historic importance and to the current residents needs,
promoted the nomination.
Architectural historian Stephen Fox and Freedmen's Town Association President Gladys
House argued in the application to the National Register that Freedmen's Town exemplified a
southern black urban community built in the early twentieth-century. The forty block historic
district once formed part of a much larger area that was the most important African American
community in Houston, they argued:
Because of its association with the first settlement of the city's freed slaves and because
of the central role it played in the development of the black community in the late
118 Houston Chronicle, Friday April 4, 1980.
119 The historically black Chamber of Commerce which was founded in the Fourth Ward before World
War II.
120 Allen Parkway Village Technical Report. 1983.
nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries, Houston's Fourth Ward, the location of the
Freedmen's Town Historic District, has long been considered the "Mother Ward for
Black Houston. Founded just after Emancipation on the southern banks of Buffalo
Bayou, the original Freedmen's Town settlement eventually grew to become the
economic, spiritual and cultural focus of Houston's black community. 121
Freedmen's Town Association sought designation for their neighborhood as a nationally
recognized historic site not only to raise the area's profile but also to gain some measure of
protection against the city's intent to encourage large-scale redevelopment there. According to
Fox and House:
Because of its proximity to downtown Houston and the constantly rising value of land,
what is left of the western section of this neighborhood is now also being threatened on
all sides. Even more so today than in the early part of this century, when it was locked
in by unbending segregation, what remains of the Freedmen's Town community stands
like an island set apart. In both reality and spirit, however, it still represents all that
survives of Houston's oldest free black settlement. 122
The Department of the Interior recognized the significance of Freedmen's Town by
placing the district on the National Register of Historic Places in 1985. Freedmen's Town
Association and its allies thus succeeded in changing the terms of the debate-outsiders could
no longer easily characterize the neighborhood as obsolete, from here onward.the residents
insisted that their district would be called the historic Freedmen's Town. 123
Listing in the National Register confers several advantages on historic properties.
Owners of listed properties can seek favorable tax treatment. The district as a whole could
receive consideration in planning for Federal, federally licensed, and federally assisted projects
as well as eligibility for Federal grants in aid.12 4
121 Freedmen's Town Historic District. National Register of Historic Places Inventory-Nomination Form, 18.
122 Freedmen's Town Historic District. National Register of Historic Places Inventory-Nomination Form, 18,
Page 11. Though the text of the application to the National Register emphasized the positive aspects of
Freedmen's Town history, the authors here nicely refer to the external, negative forces that enforced the
cohesiveness of the neighborhood. "Rather than forming a single, recognizable "ghetto" as was the case
in many larger northern cities, black Houstonians came to reside in a handful of enclaves or "urban
clusters... [which] remained largely invisible to city officials and to the majority of white Houstonians. As
Blaine Brownwell has suggested in describing general black housing patterns throughout the urban
South, these black enclaves were like 'islands set apart."' Sorelle, p. 216
123 Houston Chronicle. February 15,1985.
124 Legal notice of public hearing considering the Fourth Ward Historic District by the State Board of
Review, published in the Houston Chronicle, July 24, 1984.
Given that the City had no plans to apply for federal grants or to participate in federal
projects that would respect the districts historic character, favorable tax treatment for property
owners remained the major benefit conferred by listing on the National Register. However, by
the mid- 1980s fewer than five percent of the residents of Freedmen's Town owned their homes.
Most of the property owners in Freedmen's Town were absentee landlords who had vociferously
opposed the listing because they stood to benefit more from large-scale redevelopment than
from restoring the existing buildings, even with tax breaks.
The owners of the majority of land in Freedmen's Town often acted in unison 25 Quite a
few of the landlords descended from Italian-American immigrants who settled in the
neighborhood in the 1920s and opened grocery stores and other small businesses.126 Although
the ownership pattern was finely grained, the owners were able to act in concert. Aware of the
redevelopment potential of the holdings, these landlords committed to hold out for the value of
the land, in aggregate, rather than selling piecemeal. This ability, and willingness, to act as a
kind of monopoly alerted residents to the decided possibility that their neighborhood would be
redeveloped completely, but it also bought them some time, in that the landlords would not sell
gradually.127
Because the landowners intended eventually to sell their holdings in Freedmen's Town
to a large developer, they did not repair or maintain their houses. By 1980, Freedmen's Town
was still an inexpensive place to live, but living conditions had worsened.128 The houses were
structurally sound but needed maintenance and had not been updated. Ironically the very
conditions that allowed the City to describe the Fourth Ward as "obsolete" contributed to its
designation as "historic."
125 In 1984 land owners representing 85 percent of Freedmen's Town signed a memorandum of
agreement with the City to sell the land at a set price.
126 According to Passey and Wintz, no rigorous research has been done to support this claim. The
author's interview with Saverio Giammalva, at one time a major landowner in the neighborhood and
descendant of Italian immigrant grocers lends credence to the theory, if not rigor. Interview with Patricia
Smith Prather: "Mostly Italian landowners held on to their land in the Fourth Ward, blacks didn't [in
contrast to 5th ward]" See also item 8, page 8 NRHP and Rives Taylor, "Fourth Ward and the Siege of
Allen Parkway Village"
127 Frank Spata, largest landowner in 1980 said 'he could have moved blacks out years ago by leasing his
properties to Mexican-Americans at twice the rent" Post March 9, 1980.
128 ERA, page 16.
While the Freedmen's Town Association began to build support for the application to the
National Register in 1983, the landowners formed their own association, the Fourth Ward
Property Owners Committee to seek out a single developer for the entire Freedmen's Town
District. The decision by the Housing Authority in 1983 to request permission to tear down
Allen Parkway Village suggested to the landlords that they should prepare for speculative
interest in their properties. The property owners began to work closely with the City Planning
Director who was spearheading the effort to redevelop the area. According to Frances Corso, a
property owner, the Fourth Ward Property Owners Committee considered only a few of the
buildings to be historic and worth preserving. City Planning Director Efraim Garcia clearly
thought that the residents had overplayed their hand by requesting such a large district:
"What they (Freedmen's Town Association) have done by putting together a district of 40 blocks
of basically slums is to hurt their chances of getting the district. They didn't think this thing
through."129
Garcia argued further that even the suggestion that the area might be designated
historic would cause a flurry of demolitions and evictions, as property owners would prefer
vacant developable land to dilapidated, historical rental units. The owners and city officials,
however, did not really take seriously the possibility that the residents' application would
succeed, since a majority of landowners in the neighborhood would have to agree to the
designation. Since the property owners association controlled 80 to 85 percent of the area,
they never thought the designation would happen. 130
Despite the confidence of the property owners, and given generous notice that the State
Review board would review the application, the Freedmen's Town Association prevailed. It is
unclear why the opposition of the landowners did not prevent the designation. Some property
owners complained that they had not been properly notified because the Historical Commission
used an outdated list of property owners. Given the ample press coverage, and the supposed
unity of landlords representing eighty-five percent of the land in the district, however, this
129 City Planning Director Efraim Garcia, Houston Chronicle, July 19, 1984.
seems like a thin excuse. Insofar as each property owner received only one vote, no matter how
large or small the size of the land, perhaps the property owners misunderstood the process. A
small monopoly of property owners controlling eighty-five percent of the land might actually
have had fewer votes than the small group of owner occupants and churches that owned the
remaining fifteen percent of Freedmen's Town land. Also, some property owners possibly did
not consider the application likely to be approved under any circumstance because they
remained unconvinced of the historic value of their own property. They may not have
registered their opposition to the designation with the Historical Commission, whereas the
residents and their allies were well organized in favor of the petition. Finally, several recent
scandals suggest that the murky chains of title in the neighborhood might have clouded the
true ownership of the properties. Since much of the land had been passed down through
several generations and since few parcels were mortgaged, the ownership status of the land
had not been subject to many title examinations. Land acquisition costs for any recent
redevelopment proposal have allowed for a substantial amount of title work in order to clear up
ownership issues.131 Regardless of why the property owners did not manage to block the
designation as they had vowed, in the aftermath the property owners association discounted
the importance of the designation, noting that they were still free to demolish property.
Even though legal property owners could still demolish houses in Freedmen's Town, the
Freedmen's Town Association succeeded in creating a kind of moral ownership of their
neighborhood through its national recognition as an historic district. The residents and the
Association would be able to invoke the historic status, recognized on a national level, when
redevelopment plans failed to include preservation. They could now argue that buildings in
130 For evidence of property owner objections in the press see: Houston Downtown Magazine, November 5,
1984, Houston Post July 27, 1984, Houston Chronicle July 19, 1984
131 See Harris County Register of Deeds, Volume 3814 Page 3822 for an example of Affidavits recorded
simultaneously with conveyance of title from heirs of property to Houston Renaissance, Inc. In this
example several heirs stipulate that they have been in possession of the property since at least 1972, and
that no other person has ever asserted any claim of ownership of said premises or any right, title or
interest. In addition to uncertainty of ownership these affidavits addressed the highly imprecise legal
descriptions of property, as buildings and additions were built long before any building permits were
required in Houston. See also Houston Press, September 10, 1998 for discussion of blurred property
lines and utility easements and Houston Chronicle, December 30, 1998 on the validity of property
owners' signatures on a petition for Tax Increment Reinvestment Zone.
their neighborhood should be preserved not only because they housed people in need of
affordable shelter but also because they housed a priceless history 3 2 .
The residents scored a success, if not an absolute one. The city, through its Planning
Director, continued to seek actively a single developer to raze and reconstruct a middle to high
income community in place of Freedmen's Town, and the property owners continued to support
the most profitable redevelopment schemes. The Freedmen's Town Association did achieve two
important tactical victories: the terms of the debate had changed in that the 'obsolete' Fourth
Ward had become the 'historic' Freedmen's Town and the moral ownership of the neighborhood
had shifted towards the residents and away from the legal owners.
San Felipe Courts/Allen Parkway Village
The Resident Council of Allen Parkway Village, embroiled in direct conflict with the
Housing Authority of the City of Houston and its proposal to the public housing development,
followed the lead of their neighbors in Freedmen's Town by nominating their home to the
National Register of Historic Places in 1987. Like the Freedmen's Town residents, Allen
Parkway Village residents applied for historic designation in the face of a direct threat by the
City of Houston to raze and redevelop their neighborhood.1 33 Again like the Freedmen's Town
Association, The Resident Council specifically sought to use the designation to raise the profile
of their struggle. Listing on the National Register of Historic Places allowed The Resident
Council to forge alliances outside the neighborhood with groups of architects and
preservationists and also hampered redevelopment schemes, even by the small inconvenience
of dealing with Historic Preservation requirements when razing property. The historical
importance of the development was perhaps less compelling in the case of Allen Parkway
Village than for Freedmen's Town. The residents' application did elucidate, however, that the
community planning principles and publicly spirited architecture that inspired the architects of
Allen Parkway Village made the development as viable a home for lower income people in 1987
132 Interview with Gladys House, March 26, 1999.
as in 1941, when the project opened. Architectural Historian Stephen Fox, in his testimony to
the U. S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs Field Hearing
on the Rehabilitation of Allen Parkway Village explained:
Allen Parkway Village is an outstanding example of public spirited architecture,
landscape design, and community planning that states unequivocally that low-income
families have a legitimate place at the very center of Houston, not as barely tolerated
transients, but as citizen-residents. The quality of the complex's architecture, the
intelligence of its planning, the extraordinary durability of its construction and the
generosity of its park-like grounds are the historical attributes of the San Felipe Courts
Historic District that gave it its distinction to begin with, and they are the qualities that
will continue to make it, if properly rehabilitated and managed, not only a desirable
historic neighborhood for low-income Houston families, but a belated monument to the
success of public housing in Houston.134
Gaining historic designation thus allowed the residents to articulate their belief that the
housing development needed only repair and adequate maintenance to provide high quality
affordable housing to some of Houston's poor families and to counter the claim, made by Mayor
Bob Lanier, amongst others, that the design of San Felipe Courts/Allen Parkway Village,
doomed the project to failure by concentrating 1000 units in one location. 135
After so many years defending their right to live at Allen Parkway Village, the residents
believed that the high density of poor non-white people and not high density itself was the
reason for tearing down the development. Indeed, virtually any plan proposed for the
redevelopment would necessitate equal or higher densities of people. 136 In this respect, the
residents felt that they were facing a strikingly similar battle to those residents of the Fourth
Ward displaced by the original slum clearance project that created San Felipe Courts in the late
1930s.
133 HACH applied again in 1983 to HUD for permission to demolish APV. The $10 million grant issued by
HUD to rehabilitate rather than raze the complex had not been used.
134 Rehabilitation of Allen Parkway Village, Houston, TX. Field Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Housing and Community Development of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.
December 14, 1993.
135 IBID, p. 123.
136 Note that Mayor Lanier lived in highest density publicly subsidized housing in Houston, luxury high
rise tower in River Oaks, bailed out of bankruptcy due to S &L crisis, by government.
History of Slum Clearance in Freedmen's Town
In the 1930s Houston's African American community embraced the slum clearance
efforts funded by the United States Housing Authority, which paid up to ninety percent of the
construction costs of public housing projects that incorporated slum clearance.137 The Housing
Authority of the City of Houston (HACH), established in 1938 to administer the project locally,
built two of its four initial projects for black families. Although the black press registered little
protest against slum clearance per se, the announcement that the project planned for the
Fourth Ward would be reserved for whites only caused an uproar. Adding insult to injury, the
Housing Authority paid to the homeowners they displaced too little to buy another house in
most parts of Houston. Landowners, black and white, joined forces to protest the unfair prices,
but to no avail. Furthermore, despite federal stipulations meant to guarantee a certain
percentage of public housing jobs to blacks, they were excluded from construction and
managerial jobs.138
During this period, Houston's African American community was engaged in fighting
discrimination on much broader terms, as well. The Houston Informer frequently criticized the
FHA policy of not backing mortgages to black applicants, which effectively restricted the
housing options and institutionalized segregation.139 Backed by the NAACP and the Houston
community, a Houston dentist successfully argued to the U. S. Supreme Court in 1944 that the
Democratic Party's exclusion of black voters effectively disenfranchised him, since Houston was
essentially a one party town. This victory virtually assured African Americans the right to
137 Wagner-Steagall Act of 1937 established the United States Housing Authority. From NRHP Item 7,
Page 4.
138 The African American community appears to have won at least part of the battle, since within a short
time African American managers and staff were hired at both 'negro' developments.
139 "Houston Negroes to Get Housing Unit." Informer, December 10, 1938. "Whites to Get Fourth Ward
Site." Informer, October 7, 1939. "Fear Ouster Would Be Prelude to Exodus of Fourth Ward Negroes"
Informer, April 20, 1940. "Home Owners Protest Small Value Placed on Property by Government in
Fourth Ward," Informer, March 30, 1940. "Citizens To Fight Ejection From Homes To Finish," Informer,
April 27, 1940. " Committee Takes Protest to Housing Head; Race Called," Informer, October 14, 1939.
"U. S. Specifications on Housing Project Ignored by Council," Informer, March 16, 1940. "Race May Take
Fight to Court to Get Due Share of Skilled Work," Informer March 23, 1940. "Housing Authorities Want
More Rent But Managers' Pay Stands," Informer July 15, 1944. "A Crying Need," Informer April 24, 1943.
"For A Better South," Informer April 24, 1943.
vote. 14 0 It is interesting to note that Houston's African American community seemed more
intent on gaining access to well paying jobs, to the ballot, and to mortgages than to preserving
the houses in the Fourth Ward or to increasing the percentage of public housing units allotted
to them. When the dust settled on the slum clearance program in the City, however, the
Houston Informer analyzed the pattern of segregation that had emerged:
The cards were stacked against Negroes in the beginning. The Planning Commission of
the city of Houston had long since planned to empty the Fourth Ward of Negroes. The
Zoning map will show this design14 1 . So, when the Housing Authority suggested that
the First Negro project be build on empty land, they had in mind moving Negroes out of
the Fourth Ward into that area and the establishment of a white group in the place of
the Fourth Ward Negroes. It might have been better for Negroes to have hung their
fight on the issue of the location of the Cuney project. But, it's far short of the truth to
say that Negroes contributed to the ousting of themselves from the Fourth Ward by
accepting the Cuney project. The city Authorities would have fought just as hard then
for their scheme to oust Negroes from the Fourth Ward as they have fought
lately.. .Even... [thoselwho opposed the establishment of the first project in the Third
Ward, subsequently accepted it in the belief that the next project for Negroes would be
established in the Fourth Ward. This writer didn't smell the rat back there either. 142
The Housing Authority of the City of Houston thus managed to pull off this bait and switch --
by building the 'negro' developments up front, the HACH had a pre-existing place for the
displaced residents of Freedmen's Town to move when the signature, white only project
destroyed their community.14 3 The African American community, however, would never forget
it.
When the slum clearance projects were completed, Houston's African Americans had
lost ground, not only by losing part of the Fourth Ward but also in terms of the net number of
housing units available to them after slum clearance. Of the 2,112 units demolished, 1,741, or
140 see Smith v. Allright 321 US 649 (1944). "High Court Frees Dixie Negroes," Informe,r April 8, 1944.,"
Sapper, page 91, and Bayor page 21 for evidence of the reverberations of the decision throughout the
South. See also Grovey v. Townsend for history of Houston's African American community's involvement
in gaining the right to vote, and Sweatt v. Painter for subsequent struggle to gain access to graduate
education for African Americans in Texas, also shepherded by the Houston community.
141 Zoning map refers to a comprehensive plan created in 1929 when city officials optimistically assumed
that Houston would join other cities in instituting zoning. Though voters of course never embraced
zoning, and Houston has never had a legitimate comprehensive plan the city somehow managed to effect
the racial redistricting apparent in the 1929 plan, with the notable exception of the continued dominance
of African Americans in the Fourth Ward.
142 " F.D. R. And Strauss Asked to Give Aid" Informer July 13, 1940.
143 See Houston's Public Housing Program, 1940, page 9, quoted in NRHP Item 8 page 5 for an example of
the City's forthright desire to "obliterate an undesirable section while providing affordable housing for
eighty-two percent, were characterized "non-white" whereas only 897 total units in the new
public housing developments were allocated to 'non-white families'-a net loss of over 1200
units.14 4 By 1945 the Housing Authority capped its waiting list of eligible black families at
5000. The demand for scarce public housing units never abated. By 1987, the situation had
not improved, as more than five thousand families waited for housing.
Mindful of the HACH's legacy of displacement and cognizant of the pressing need for
more units of public housing, the Allen Parkway Village Resident Council never wavered in its
opposition to any demolition. Applying for historic designation was, in some sense, a strategy
to ensure that history would not be repeated. By memorializing the creation of white-only
development that had destroyed a black community, the Resident Council hoped to preserve a
resource of affordable housing for all kinds of future Houstonians.
The Resident Council enlisted the assistance of Rice University Architecture Professor
Nia Becnel, to complete the application. Even though the development's ostensible owner, the
Housing Authority, along with City Hall did not support the application, Allen Parkway Village
was added to the National Register of Historic Places in 1988, after being added to the State list
in 1987.145 Although their successful application was a coup, given the open hostility towards
it from local authorities, the historic preservation designation offered only weak protection
against demolition.14 6 According to Jim Steely, director of the National Register Program for the
Texas Historical Commission, once the property was listed on the National Register, "federal
funds can not be used to demolish without extensive analysis and documentation by federal
preservationists. There is no guarantee that it won't be demolished."14 7 Unlike other cities,
such as New York, no local preservation laws existed that would offer any further protection
against demolition.
some of Houston's white families." The subtlety of the manipulation lay in the timing of the
announcements.
144 Housing Authority of the City of Houston, Annual Report 1944-1945. See also Bayor, page 58 for
discussion of similar practices in Atlanta.
145 Houston Chronicle, October 6, 1987.
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Aware of the thin protection historic preservation offered, the Resident Council
conceived of the push to get listed on the National Register as only one part of a multi-pronged
strategy. They pressured Congressman Mickey Leland, via their ally and chair of the House
Banking Finance and Urban Affairs Committee, Henry Gonzalez, to write federal legislation
specifically prohibiting the use of federal funds to demolish Allen Parkway Village. The
advantage of the listing on the National Register was not, then, in prohibiting the use of federal
funds to demolish the structure, but was in delaying the development process and in raising
the profile of the residents' struggle.148
The Resident Council consciously evoked Allen Parkway Village's relationship with
Freedmen's Town in its argument for the historic importance of the public housing
development. "Together, these two communities represent a compelling historical continuum: a
classic, late 19th-century low-income neighborhood and its idealistic 20th-century "slum
clearance" successor. 149
Conclusion
In light of the recent destruction of Allen Parkway Village and much of Freedmen's
Town, historic designation did not offer the residents much protection in their fight against
demolition. The residents were well aware of the weaknesses of the strategy. Gaining national
recognition for the historic importance of their community was just one part of a multi-pronged
strategy. The added regulations for demolishing historic properties hindered any
redevelopment scheme, buying the residents valuable time. The residents of Allen Parkway
Village, in particular, realized the need to fight at the federal level, since federal agencies would
have to play a central role in any redevelopment decision.
The less tangible benefits of historic designation were at least as important to the
residents. The press coverage garnered by the successful applications provided a forum for the
residents to reframe the redevelopment issue. By characterizing their neighborhood as historic,
148 Interview with Lenwood Johnson, March 27, 1999 and Allen Parkway Village Rehabilitation Proposal,
Residents' Council September 19, 1993.
the Freedmen's Town residents could counter arguments that their neighborhood was obsolete.
Allen Parkway Village residents argued in their application that the public housing development
was a successful example of community planning, countering the argument that the
development was outdated and fatally flawed in its design.
Since the Housing Authority's first attempt in 1941 to make the Fourth Ward disappear
from the view of white, middle class Houston, African Americans have struggled to defend their
right to exist in the center of Houston. Elevating the history of the neighborhood to a level of
national historic importance was another way of making visible 'invisible Houston' and to
legitimate the claims of the residents to be there. In articulating the history of their
community, the residents did not gloss over its painful aspects. Thus, the Freedmen's Town
Association fought to save the hanging tree located in their neighborhood, along with the
churches. And the Resident Council of Allen Parkway Village would not forget the divisive
history of segregation and displacement inscribed into their built environment. In defending
Allen Parkway Village against yet another parry by the Housing Authority in 1993, resident ally
Stephen Fox explained:
Thus, Allen Parkway Village represents, over the entire course of its existence, one
lamentable chapter after another in the racial politics of 20h-centruy American housing.
Today, historians are much keener than once was the case to the experiences and
culture of marginalized peoples who, because of poverty and racial prejudice, were
judged not to have contributed significantly to American history. In this respect, Allen
Parkway Village and Fourth Ward emerge as important monuments to a more searching
and inclusive view of American history and culture, one that does not suppress the
existence of injustice and discrimination.150
Ultimately, though, placing Allen Parkway Village and the Fourth Ward on a par with other,
more traditionally recognized historic monuments, still only elevated the neighborhood to a
relatively insecure status. Texans in general and Houstonians in particular have yet to
embrace historic preservation, if designating property as historic could interfere with sacred
property rights. Essayist Joel Warren Barna explains: "[ownership] is the right to use or
dispose of a building however the owner pleases. Such rights have been exercised with
149 NRHP nomination.
150 Testimony of Stephen Fox, p. 155. House Field hearing, December 14, 1993.
unquestioned vigor throughout Texas for as long as anyone can remember. The significant
historic preservation fights of the 1980s... waged by do-gooder groups seeking to stop owners
from exercising their rights to alter or destroy buildings only proved the rule."15 1 Historic
preservationists consistently lost to developers, no matter whose history the structures
commemorated.
Houston's fledgling historic preservation movement embraced the importance of
Freedmen's Town, but on its own terms. Fearing that the continued neglect and abandonment
of Freedmen's Town would result in its complete loss, historic preservationists successfully
lobbied to remove the Jack Yates house from the neighborhood, and to place it in a park with
other historic homes. While this move recognized the importance of the father of Freedmen's
Town to all Houstonians, severing the historic building from its community was a cruel blow to
the people fighting to preserve the neighborhood. African American historic preservationist
Patricia Smith Prather described the pain this move caused, and the reason that she supported
it:
Really, there has been a systematic dismantling of that historic community. I helped in
one piece of that, which I feel badly about. When we moved the Jack Yates house out of
there it was sort of like giving in.. .I was on the side of preservation-if we couldn't move
it out of there we'd lose it. It was unoccupied, we couldn't get insurance and we were
going to lose it. Symbolically, though, doing that, other preservationists said, with
respect to Freedmen's Town, it ain't gonna happen.




A key part of the residents' strategies was to enlist the support and assistance of
powerful people outside of the neighborhood, to counteract the powerful array of interests
aligned against them. The residents were very successful in attracting professionals,
particularly architects and lawyers, to their cause. Legislators such as Henry Gonzalez and
Mickey Leland pressured the city from their vantage in Washington. The Freedmen's Town
Association used the Community Reinvestment Act to force banks and other lenders to invest
in the neighborhood. Leveraging relationships with groups outside the neighborhood allowed
the residents to broaden the constituency for their struggle, to raise its profile, and to bring in
resources to the neighborhood.
Freedmen's Town Association and the Community Reinvestment Act1
Freedmen's Town Association President Gladys House believed that Freedmen's Town
residents themselves should take control of the neighborhood's development. House had
demonstrated the capacity to get things done, and generated a host of worthy projects, but
always struggled to find funding. Excluded from the City's block grant programs, and too rag-
tag for most foundations, the Association devised an alternative and successful strategy for
funding their projects: blackmailing banks.
The reinvigorated Community Reinvestment Act allowed community based organizations
to protest lenders that had not reinvested in their communities. In this case, because
downtown had appropriated Freedmen's Town, the Freedmen's Town Association could
legitimately object to any Houston banks' activities. Banks involved in mergers paid particular
attention to complaints registered by community organizations, since regulators will delay
mergers to investigate such complaints. The merger mania of the early 1990s gave the
Freedmen's Town Association extraordinary leverage. By 1991 nearly every bank and savings
& loan association had donated money, lent money or deposited money in the Freedmen's Town
Credit Union. 5 2
Even though most of Houston's lending institutions 'reinvested' in Freedmen's Town,
few bankers liked the Freedmen's Town Associations' extortionist methods. Gladys House
could, and did, write a mean letter accusing banks, for example, of making insulting donations
of only $1000. Bankers openly protested these tactics, but they paid nonetheless, fearful that
the letter writing campaign could scuttle multi-million dollar mergers. In response to the
bankers' complaints of feeling threatened, House countered: "So they feel threatened. How do
you think black people felt? Our communities were deteriorating and we couldn't get any
loans. That's a threat."153
152 Houston Chronicle, February 17, 1991.
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She dismissed any suggestion that she would do better with the banks by using a softer
touch. Freedmen's Town by 1991 had deteriorated rapidly. The scheme to package the
neighborhood for a developer in the 1980s and the Founder's Park scheme in the 1990s had
both failed, but House knew that the city or a group of developers would eventually propose
another scheme. Freedmen's Town Association needed to start acting like its own developer,
and it needed to do it immediately. She could not afford to let bankers off easily.
The Freedmen's Town Association funded a plethora of activities. Small businesses,
such as a washateria and a sandwich shop, received start up loans. Residents painted houses,
planted community gardens and opened a credit union. Eventually they planned to start
building new houses to fill in the vacant lots scattered throughout the community.
Several obstacles prevented the Freedmen's Town Association from enjoying even more
success with the Community Reinvestment Act funding. The organization kept atrocious
financial records, when they kept records at all. House explained that more important things,
such as getting the funding and starting programs, occupied her time. She would not spend
scarce dollars on an accountant's salary. The shoddy record keeping, however, prevented other
organizations, such as foundations, which did not have a fear-based relationship with
Freedmen's Town, from donating to the organization.
Ultimately the more severe obstacle to Freedmen's Town's success was the
organizations' deteriorating relationship with other leaders in the community. A group of
ministers and other leaders formed the Freedman's Town Association/Fourth Ward
Neighborhood Association as an alternative to the Freedmen's Town Association. House
dismissed the ministers' influence, explaining "I listened to preachers all my life talk about the
problems in my neighborhood. Talk, talk, talk. That's all they did. These folks are going to
talk our community out of existence." The lack of unity amongst the community's leadership
would eventually undermine Freedmen's Town chances to survive the city's next attempt to
gain control of the neighborhood.
Houston Housing Concern:
Aware that City Council could ignore the pleas of the dwindling Allen Parkway Village
residents, the residents recognized the need to amplify the constituency for Allen Parkway
Village beyond the residents themselves. Resident Council President Lenwood Johnson
facilitated the creation of an advocacy group called The Houston Housing Concern in the mid-
1980s. With membership of 100 civic and religious groups from all parts of Houston, the group
ostensibly advocated for increased affordable housing for Houston's low-income citizens. In
reality, the group dealt primarily with Allen Parkway Village and Fourth Ward issues.154
Lenwood Johnson described the leadership of Houston Housing Concern as "a group of
suburban white women, married to oil company executives." The Houston Housing Concern
adopted resolutions almost exactly like those of the Resident Council, but when the middle-
class suburban matrons presented their views, members of the City Council listened.
Presumably, the city councilors listened not only because the white, middle-class members of
the organization tended to garner more consideration themselves, but also because they
conceivably represented a formidable voting bloc.155
Joan Denkler, president of Houston Housing Concern from its beginning in the middle
1980s, testified twice before Congress, appeared on many occasions before the City Council and
spoke frequently to the press. In addition to broadening opportunities to articulate the
residents' vision, members of the non-profit organization often came to the defense of the
residents, when the press or the Housing Authority demonized them. For example, in 1993
Lenwood Johnson's constant harrangue of the Housing Authority and city officials had
prompted accusations that he was not only intransigent but also living off donations to the
tenants' organization. In response, Ms. Denkler testified that Mr. Johnson lived in complete
poverty and in complete service to his friends and neighbors.156
154 See testimony from Houston Housing Concern members to Congress in 1985 and 1993, "Resolution to
Bring the Allen Parkway Village issue to a Quick Conclusion," "Resolution Opposing a Tax Incremental
Finance District in Fourth Ward/North Montrose" and letter "Just Say No to Founder's Park." The HHC's
views expressed in all of these documents demonstrate remarkable alignment with the Resident Council's
agenda.
'55 Interview Lenwood Johnson, March 26, 1999.
156 Testimony before House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee, 1993, page 75.
In a particularly clever tactic, the Houston Housing Concern melded the Allen Parkway
Village and Fourth Ward residents' concerns to the ever popular argument of protecting
property rights. The City's development schemes for Freedmen's Town would inevitably require
some type of land use controls, such as Tax Increment Finance (TIF) Districts or even takings
by eminent domain, according to literature circulated by the Houston Housing Concern. TIF
districts essentially siphon all future increases in taxes in a specific district to pay for
infrastructure improvements, causing City services on the whole to suffer either through
dilution of services or through a tax increases. The same voters throughout Houston that had
defeated zoning would not like the 'back-door zoning' brought by TIF districts, especially if the
TIF diverted revenue from their own municipal services. Likening the City's intention to
displace Freedmen's Town and Allen Parkway Village residents to the specter of the dilution of
property rights and to the threat of diminished services alerted a wide group of voters to the
neighborhood's struggle. 1 57 The Houston Housing Concern campaign certainly assisted the
demise of the Founder's Park scheme, which was dependent on a TIF district that Houston
voters refused to endorse.
Henry B. Gonzalez
In Henry B. Gonzalez, the people of Allen Parkway Village and the Fourth Ward found
an ideal champion. The thirty-two year veteran of the U. S. House of Representatives entered
politics as young man in San Antonio because of the bitter, racially tinged battle to site public
housing in Houston's neighboring city late in the 1930s. Opponents of public housing hired
thugs to attack a Jesuit priest who had been working for the creation of public housing; a
college-aged Henry Gonzalez defended the priest both in spirit, by joining his crusade, and in
body, by protecting him when he was attacked, by stoning in one instance. He went on to work
for the nascent housing authority and then to become the first Mexican American member of
the Texas Legislature. In his first, legendary year as a state representative, Gonzalez set the
record for longest continuous filibuster. For seventy-two hours the young man argued alone
157 Kate Thomas, "Developers eye back-door attack on taxpayers' pocketbooks," Houston Post, July 25,
against a series of segregationist measures designed to combat the recent Supreme Court
decision in Brown v. Board of Education. When he finally finished, bare foot and exhausted, he
had extinguished two out of six of the segregationist initiatives. He moved on to the U. S.
Congress in time to witness the creation of HUD in the early sixties and spent the next thirty-
eight years as a member of Congress serving on housing committees. Throughout his career,
he continued to throw himself into the defense of public housing, and was never afraid to
recognize the ugly racial politics and discrimination toward the poor that swirled around the
Allen Parkway Village conflict. He also had learned the power of wearing down his opponent
through endless debate.158
Congressman Gonzalez entered the Allen Parkway Village fray in 1979. Leveraging his
membership on the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee, Gonzalez interceded
when the Housing Authority of the City of Houston announced its intention to raze Allen
Parkway Village. Gonzalez arranged a meeting with HUD's secretary and Houston's
congressional delegation. Together the group hashed out an alternative. Instead of
encouraging the Housing Authority to apply formally for demolition, HUD could issue a $10
million grant for renovation and repair. The Housing Authority rescinded its application and
accepted the money, and Congressman Gonzalez retained a personal interest in seeing that
grant used for its intended purpose.
In light of the Housing Authority's failure to attempt any rehabilitation since 1979,
Gonzalez viewed the Housing Authority's 1984 demolition application to HUD with grave
concern. By this point, the $10 million grant had funded only a study recommending
demolition and some shoddy, temporary roof patching. At least $8.5 million remained. At the
behest of Resident Council President Lenwood Johnson, the Congressman held a hearing of the
House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee in Houston, to review the state of Allen
Parkway Village. Neither Housing Authority Executive Director Earl Phillips nor any other
1990.
158 1993 Hearing before House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. Page 62.
representative of the organization attending the meeting, nor did the Authority allow the
Congressman to hold the hearing at Allen Parkway Village.159
In exile at a nearby community center, Congressman Gonzalez heard testimony from
the incensed Allen Parkway Village tenants and others. Freedmen's Town residents argued
that saving Allen Parkway Village was the only way to prevent the City from handing over
Freedmen's Town to developers. Activists and professionals rebutted the Housing Authority's
claims of obsolescence, and presented evidence that Housing Authority employees had vastly
overestimated the cost of renovation in hopes of making demolition more feasible. As a result of
the hearing, Gonzalez personally requested that HUD secretary Pierce withhold his agency's
decision on the demolition application until more information was available. Commenting later
on his unusually personal role in the Allen Parkway Village issue, Gonzalez explained:
Yes, I don't like to improperly interfere, but we have been in the last 8 years for sure in
very, very constant and close contact with Mr. Lenwood and others. I did make myself
obnoxious to the then leaders of the city, both the housing authority as well as the local
government. As both chairman of the Subcommittee on Housing and as an individual
intervenor, I attempted to ward off the demolition by going through several levels in
order to have some impact.160
While Gonzalez continued to hold off Pierce--by some accounts on at least three
occasions the Congressman personally asked the HUD Secretary to wait on the application--1
6 1
he was also working in his own backyard, the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs
Committee, of which the 70 year old Congressman from San Antonio was by now Chairman.
He urged Houston Congressman Mickey Leland to craft legislation designed to prevent HUD's
from demolishing Allen Parkway Village. Congress passed the so-called Frost-Leland
Amendment in 1988, just as HUD Secretary Pierce' tolerance for Gonzalez' interference had
begun to run out. In a 1987 letter to Gonzalez, Pierce scolded that HUD "has provided almost 2
years for you to complete your study of APV. During that time, the project has continued to
159 Interview with Lenwood Johnson, March 26, 1999 and 1993 Hearing before House Committee.
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deteriorate and may now pose a danger to the relatively few remaining residents."162 HUD did
not, however, have a chance to review the application before Congress approved the Frost-
Leland Amendment, barring the use of federal funds to demolish Allen Parkway Village. After
the U. S. District Court upheld the Frost-Leland Amendment in 1989, the Housing Authority
withdrew its still pending 1984 application to HUD for the right to demolish Allen Parkway
Village.
When the Housing Authority's demolition proposal resurfaced in 1993, Congressman
Gonzalez held yet another field hearing in Houston to discuss the proposal.16 3 This time, the
Housing Authority allowed the Chairman to hold the meeting at Allen Parkway Village.
Housing Authority Executive Director Joy Fitzgerald, Houston Mayor Bob Lanier and HUD
Secretary and former mayor of Gonzalez' hometown of San Antonio Henry Cisneros, all
attended. Despite Lanier's claim reported the day before in the press that Houston had secured
the HOPE VI grant and that the majority of the projects' land would be sold off to private
developers, HUD Secretary Cisneros pledged that none of Allen Parkway Village's valuable land
would be sold to developers. Under the watchful eye of the powerful Chairman of the
committee responsible for overseeing HUD, the HUD Secretary thus hewed a middle road
intended to please all three parties. Houston's Mayor still looked forward to a major overhaul of
the 'eyesore' of Allen Parkway Village, funded with a deluxe $32 million grant from HUD; the
public housing residents had some measure of security that the overhaul would benefit lower
income people; neighboring Freedmen's Town residents felt that their neighborhood could still
rely on the presence of public housing at Allen Parkway Village to fend off excessive developer
speculation. 164
162 Michael King, "Once More Unto the Village, Dear Friends, Once More!" Houston Press. December 23,
1993, page 7.
163 In the interim between the Houston hearings, Congressman Gonzalez managed to pass the Cranston-
Gonzalez Housing Act o f 1990 under the Reagan Administration. The Act resulted from four years of
intense debate and negotiation and represented a major victory for housing advocates. See Keyes,
Strategies and Saints, page 226.
164 Michael King, "Once More Unto the Village, Dear Friends, Once More!" Houston Press. December 23,
1993, page 7.
Gonzalez, however, had not pledged his life to fighting for public housing in order to give
up on the existing Allen Parkway Village. Long after the honchos departed the 1993 hearing,
Gonzalez continued to listen to residents, activists and consultants, many of whom fondly
remembered his 1985 visit. He revealed his willingness to fight the HOPE VI grant by
questioning the city's ability to provide one-for-one replacement of Allen Parkway Village, since
HACH had not successfully sited public housing in Houston in years. Gonzalez also called the
proposal illegal:
This is in direct contravention of the Amendment that the late Mickey Leland (D-
Houston) and I put into law in 1988 that specifically prohibits the use of any federal
funds in any fiscal year to demolish Allen Parkway Village. 165
By the time that Tom Delay (R-Houston) reintroduced the idea of repealing Frost-Leland in
1996, the Gonzalez had lost chairmanship of the powerful Committee to the new Republican
majority, and could not prevent its repeal in 1996. The HOPE VI project, calling for the
demolition of at least eighty percent of Allen Parkway Village's units, went forward.
In his last intercession on behalf of Allen Parkway Village residents, Congressman
Gonzalez arranged for a grant of $300,000 for the Resident Council in 1995. He hoped that the
money would allow the residents to take their place at the table in deciding how the lucrative
HOPE VI grant would reshape Allen Parkway Village. Gonzalez wished to avert repeating
199 1's forced mediation debacle, in which the residents felt outgunned by the array of
professionals lined up on behalf of the Housing Authority. The residents never received the
money, since the Housing Authority and the Resident Council could not agree on the terms of
the grant. The contract drafted by the Housing Authority required the residents to promise not
to sue the Housing Authority and to sign away other rights. By this time, the ailing 80 year old
Gonzalez could not assist the residents, who never found another champion like him.
165 1993 Hearing and Michael King, "Once More Unto the Village, Dear Friends, Once More!" Houston
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Congressman Mickey Leland
Congressman Mickey Leland, a Houston democrat with deep personal ties to the Fourth
Ward, actively advocated the residents' position both in Washington and Houston. Accused by
some constituents of spending too much time dealing with issues of hunger in Africa in lieu of
concentrating on poverty in his own district, Leland associated himself, starting in 1987, with
the intensely local issue of preserving Allen Parkway Village and Freedmen's Town as places for
low income African Americans. Leland's primary contribution to the dispute, the Frost-Leland
Amendment, prohibited the use of federal funds to demolish Allen Parkway Village and two
public housing development in Dallas. Ironically, Leland then came under fire for using his
position in Congress inappropriately to resolve local issues and to meddle with local decision
makers, such as the Housing Authority.
Several key strategists, namely Henry Gonzalez, Lenwood Johnson and Martin Frost,
fashioned The Frost-Leland Amendment, but Mickey Leland championed the measure through
Congress. In the local battle that brewed, Leland primarily opposed Tom DeLay, (R-Houston)
whose district did not include the Fourth Ward, but who did argue for the interests of the city
and the Housing Authority. DeLay contended that preserving Allen Parkway Village amounted
to condemning poor people to live in outmoded, decrepit housing. By selling the land, the
Housing Authority could afford to build twice as many units as it would lose. Tellingly, DeLay
insisted that the demolition proposal "is supported by the Houston Housing Authority, by the
City of Houston, the city of Houston government and the politicians of the city of Houston." 166
He did not mention the expressed preferences of the residents.
Leland responded by arguing that HUD should be preserving public housing as a
resource, but under the siege of the Reagan administration's privatization agenda, the agency
was undermining the interests of low income Americans. With at least 5,000 people on the
waiting list, and additional tens of thousands of eligible applicants, it did not make any sense
to destroy a resource for affordable housing. Even if the Housing Authority could make good
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on its pledge to produce twice as many units with the proceeds of the sale, Leland insisted that,
without a reasonable, actual plan for the replacement units, the residents could not believe the
Housing Authority's pledge. Nothing in the Housing Authority's history led the residents to
believe that the agency could build more units of public housing. Finally, Leland represented
the actual preferences of the residents, with whom he had a personal relationship. "If we
destroy Allen Parkway Village, we would destroy a whole community, a whole neighborhood,
and, yes, even a history." 167 The actual site of Freedmen's Town and of Allen Parkway Village
could not be duplicated elsewhere; even if the Housing Authority managed to build thousands
of replacement units, it could never rebuild the lost community.
Leland patently distrusted DeLay's argument for the destruction of Allen Parkway
Village. He did not believe that the Housing Authority and the City, after years of corruption
and mismanagement, had instantly developed the capacity to build affordable housing on a
large-scale. Instead, Leland believed that "The proposal to demolish Allen Parkway Village is
fueled by the Reagan Administration's disdain from building and renovating public housing
projects and the desire of some to build private developments close to the downtown business
districts." 16 8 After the acrimonious debate, the vote followed strictly partisan lines, as
democrats sided with Leland and republicans with DeLay. Since democrats outnumbered
republicans in 1988, Frost-Leland passed into law.
Leland stayed involved with the Allen Parkway issue until his tragic 1989 death in an
airplane accident. When HUD continued to consider the Housing Authority of the City of
Houston's demolition application, Leland reminded the agency that "the intent of the Frost-
Leland amendment was to disallow HUD's approval for the demolition of these developments --
for such action makes no sense and is bad public policy."169 The Housing Authority retracted
the application shortly thereafter. Leland had succeeded in removing HUD's ability to assist
the Housing Authority in razing Allen Parkway Village, and thereby handing his constituents in
167 Congressional Record, September 2, 1987
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Allen Parkway Village residents wanted to change the political climate and conventional
wisdom about the failure of public housing. They knew that their home could be a good place
for low-income people to live, if properly repaired and maintained. By the 1980s, however, the
general attitude of Houstonians toward Allen Parkway Village was that the decrepit and
abandoned buildings demonstrated the failure of high-density subsidized housing and that the
desirable location of the land made the tenure of the dwindling number of residents a shameful
waste. Changing the local political culture that held that valuable land must be developed into
its most lucrative use was a daunting task, but ultimately the residents believed that without a
local mandate to preserve public housing, the Housing Authority and the political elite of
Houston would eliminate Allen Parkway Village.
If creating a mandate for the maintenance of public housing defined long-term success,
in the short term the residents needed to prevent the demolition of Allen Parkway Village.
Initiating a broad range of legal actions against the Housing Authority allowed the residents to
temporarily constrain the Housing Authority from razing Allen Parkway Village, while also
widening the public awareness of their plight. The significant press coverage garnered by the
various lawsuits created another forum in which the residents could articulate their vision, in
hopes that the constituency for preserving public housing would grow.
The lawsuits unearthed unsavory practices, such as racial steering, strategic evictions,
and intentional neglect, used by the Housing Authority in its attempt to erase Allen Parkway
Village. The Resident Council's significant victories increased the group's credibility as a force
to be reckoned with, and also obliged the Housing Authority to deal with residents' concerns, at
least for several years. The strategy succeeded in bringing in support both from other residents
of Freedmen's Town and from architects, lawyers and activists from outside the neighborhood.
The disadvantage of the legal strategy, over the long run, was that public opinion shifted from
perceiving the Resident Council as David fighting the Housing Authority's Goliath to perceiving
the residents as perpetual malcontents. In the end, the Housing Authority played the same
legal game, doggedly appealing every decision, complying only minimally with court orders and
never reconsidering its intent to raze the public housing development. In the end, finding
competent legal assistance for nearly twenty years proved impossible for the impoverished
residents, whose legal strategy alone could not change the dominant political will in Houston.
Racial Steering and Evictions
Once the Housing Authority made clear its intention to demolish Allen Parkway Village
in 1978, existing residents became obstacles to be removed, rather than important
stakeholders. As the first well-publicized lawsuit against the Housing Authority detailed, the
Housing Authority chose to use racial tension to its advantage in attempting to minimize the
trouble the residents could cause in objecting to the demolition. Between 1980 and 1983, the
Housing Authority passed over every Black family on the waiting list and instead placed a large
number of Indo-Chinese families into Allen Parkway Village. 17 0 The plaintiffs in the class action
suit alleged that the Housing Authority deliberately attempted to dilute the organization of the
largely Black tenants of Allen Parkway Village.
A class-action lawsuit filed by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) on behalf of
the Black applicants denied admission to Allen Parkway Village related the plight of Ms.
Johnson, a representative plaintiff. Ms. Johnson applied for a public housing unit around the
time that the Housing Authority decided to raze Allen Parkway Village. The plaintiffs alleged
that the Housing Authority "considered that demolishing a low income project with a
predominately Black population would engender intense political opposition. In order to defuse
this opposition Defendant (HACH) intentionally adopted practices which would steer Blacks out
of Allen Parkway Village while placing Indo-Chinese into Allen Parkway Village." 17 1 Not only did
170 Houston's Vietnamese community is the second largest in the U.S., largely due to the refugee
population arriving after the Vietnamese conflict ended in the 1970s and the subsequent arrival of family
members.
171 Abstracted from Luis Cano manuscript collection, Folder 6.
the Housing Authority give priority to the new Indo-Chinese applicants, but it did not rent any
apartments to Black families, even as they became vacant. As of the time of the suit (1983) 300
apartments sat empty and Indo-Chinese residents had become the majority. The plaintiffs,
representing all other African Americans who had been placed on the waiting list, argued that
they had been denied housing because of their race.
In the wake of the lawsuit, the Housing Authority ceased to rent any apartments at
Allen Parkway Village and instead boarded up units as they became vacant. This policy
corresponded to the Authority's submission of a formal application to HUD to demolish the
development in 1984. Furthermore, the Housing Authority moved to evict a number of the
Indo-Chinese families in residency at Allen Parkway Village. The families had moved in
illegally, according to HACH. It turns out that a Housing Authority employee had been
soliciting kickbacks from the Vietnamese tenants in exchange for entry into an apartment
without waiting. As Vietnamese families departed, the HACH employee would register a new
family under the same name, thus circumventing the wait list. Once HACH fired the employee,
the residents themselves were held liable for their fraudulent actions and served notice of
eviction.
Contrary to the Housing Authority's predictions, the primarily African-American
Resident Council rallied around the Vietnamese families. The Council went to court, gaining a
one-year reprieve from evictions for the families. In addition to signaling their ability to work
together despite racial differences, the Resident Council sought to prevent the attrition of their
population. The Vietnamese families that moved out certainly would not be replaced, under the
Housing Authority's plan to depopulate Allen Parkway Village. When, years later, the last
families were finally evicted from Allen Parkway Village, the residents, both African American
and Vietnamese, mourned the loss of their community gardens, filled with southeast asian
vegetables along with more typical texan greenery. Thus, if the Black residents acted
strategically in defending the Vietnamese families' right to live at Allen Parkway Village, the
solidarity that the move engendered lasted far longer than the duration of the suit.
Gulf Coast Legal Foundation 1984-1987
In 1984 The Housing Authority of the City of Houston (HACH) submitted an official
proposal to HUD requesting permission to demolish Allen Parkway Village. While HUD had
previously rebuffed HACH's demolition schemes, instead directing the agency to renovate the
dilapidated development, HUD accepted the 1984 proposal. HACH's formal demolition request
alarmed the Resident Council, which responded with alacrity. Fortunately for the residents,
HUD typically required extensive assessment and feasibility studies before approving any
demolition, which bought the residents time to try to prevent the demolition.
The Resident Council engaged Gulf Coast Legal Foundation (GCLF) to represent the
interests of the public housing tenants. GCLF, a legal-aid foundation, offered free long term
legal assistance, a boon to the impoverished residents. Lawsuits brought by the ACLU had
already generated positive press coverage and shed light on some of HACH's unsavory
practices. The relationship with Gulf Coast offered opportunities for the residents to bring a
broader range of suits against the Housing Authority, in order to address their fundamental
concern that Allen Parkway Village would be demolished without any practical replacement.
While the ACLU dealt with class action law suits alleging that the Housing Authority's policy of
racial steering had violated tenants' civil rights, Gulf Coast could tackle the much broader
range of concerns not related to civil rights violations.
Unfortunately, residents and observers later came to believe that Gulf Coast mishandled
the residents' claims. In particular, Gulf Coast waited a long time, more than three years, to
file suit against HACH. During those three years, 1984 to 1987, HUD repeatedly told HACH
that any attempt to demolish Allen Parkway Village without a plan for replacing every unit
would be illegal. Although on at least three occasions between 1984 and 1987 HUD labeled
HACH's actions illegal, Gulf Coast waited until 1987 to make the same argument in a lawsuit
filed on the residents' behalf. During that period, the occupancy of Allen Parkway Village
declined from over 900 occupied units to fewer than 120, as the Housing Authority stopped
renting apartments. 7 2
Gulf Coast only filed suit after the legal aid organizations' negligence received negative
press coverage. The lack of action caused speculation that Gulf Coast entertained an agenda
other than that of protecting the public housing residents' interests. An advocate for the public
housing tenants described a meeting with Gulf Coast: "I was attacked [verbally] by one of the
Gulf Coast board members, who told me they clearly do have board members who don't want
this suit to succeed." 173 The Gulf Coast board received funding via the City of Houston's
Community Development Block Grant program and therefore the Mayor could exert pressure
on the organization, alleged the Resident Council. The ties between the Mayor and Gulf Coast
disturbed the residents, given Mayor Whitmire's public commitment to demolishing Allen
Parkway Village.
In the wake of negative publicity, Gulf Coast did pursue a lawsuit against the Housing
Authority. Though ultimately dismissed in 1993, the suit constrained the Housing Authority to
some extent.17 4 The Resident Council relied on a number of strategies besides legal
intervention. In 1987 the Resident Council managed to get Allen Parkway Village onto the
National Register of Historic Places, and in response to pressure exerted by the Resident
Council, United States Congressman Mickey Leland sponsored legislation in 1988 prohibiting
the use of federal funds to demolish Allen Parkway Village. Although ultimately none of these
measures proved strong enough to prevent the destruction of Allen Parkway Village, together
they tied up the Housing Authority in litigation for nearly 10 years.
The Frost-Leland Amendment
Before HUD had the opportunity to act on the Housing Authority's 1984 request to
demolish Allen Parkway Village. Mickey Leland squeezed the so-called Frost-Leland Amendment
172 Public News, August 12, 1992
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into a 1988 omnibus appropriations act. HUD's failure to act on the request can be explained
in no small measure by Congressman Henry Gonzalez' repeated requests to HUD to delay
action. Aware that even the powerful chairman of the House Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs Committee could not stall HUD forever, the residents, along with Chairman Gonzalez,
pressured Congressman Leland to create some additional legislative protection for Allen
Parkway Village. Congressman Leland joined forces with Dallas' Congressman Martin Frost,
whose constituents faced a similar battle over aging public housing. The following line added
to a House appropriations bill answered the residents' prayers:
None of the funds appropriated by this Act or any other Act for any fiscal year shall be
used for demolishing George Loving Place, at 3320 Rupert Street, Edgar Ward Place, at
3901 Holystone, Elmer Scott Place, at 2600 Morris, in Dallas, Texas, or Allen Parkway
Village, 1600 Allen Parkway, in Houston, Texas.1 7 5
Temporary Injunction against the Housing Authority, 1989
The Allen Parkway Village Resident Council lost no time in taking advantage of the
Frost-Leland Amendment. When in 1989 the Housing Authority used federal funds to study
demolition options, the residents sued, alleging that the Housing Authority had violated Frost-
Leland by using federal funds to pave the way for demolition. The residents argued further that
the Housing Authority's persistent neglect and refusal to rent any apartments in Allen Parkway
Village constituted a defacto policy of demolition. 176
The residents scored an important victory when Judge Hoyt granted them a temporary
injunction against the Housing Authority. The injunction temporarily prevented the Housing
Authority from using federal funds to demolish Allen Parkway Village, to move residents or to
buy replacement units, until the residents' pending lawsuit came to trial.
174 GCLF also sponsored an appraisal of APV, which concluded that the land under the development
would sell for 27 million. Contrasted with the Housing Authority's oft stated claim that the land would be
worth in excess of 150 million, the appraisal provided excellent public relations for the Residents' Council.
175 United States Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations
Act, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, Title IF, Section 415, 101 Stat. 1329-213.
176 Houston Chronicle, April 14, 1989
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The Housing Authority had argued that using federal funds to study demolition did not
constitute a violation of Frost-Leland. By initiating action against the Housing Authority over
the soft costs of demolition - the consultants' studies that would analyze the best way to
demolish the development--The Resident Council aggressively pushed for a confirmation of
Frost-Leland. The Court bolstered the residents' position, agreeing that "the term 'for
demolishing' refers not simply to the physical act of destruction but to the process by which
destruction is commenced and finished. In this regard, destruction of property may begin long
before physical destruction occurs."177 The Court thus sent a strong message to the Housing
Authority that the definition of 'demolishing' encompassing any action that would eventually
lead to destruction of property.
Judge Hoyt sided with the residents' charge that the Housing Authority intended to
destroy Allen Parkway Village either through straightforward demolition, or through malign
neglect. He reasoned:
The evidence shows that the HACH commenced destruction of the APV apartments in
1983. Ever since the HACH's application for renovation was rejected by HUD [in 19781,
the HACH has ceased to actively repair and to improve APV apartments. Indeed, this
policy of no-renovation has admittedly contributed to the uninhabitability of over 90
percent of the available units. The HACH's 1984formal application to demolish the APV
apartments simply memorialized a defacto policy to raze the apartments.. .As a matter of
public policy, funds should not be used to study and plan an activity which activity
cannot be legally accomplished with those same funds. (emphasis mine)
Judge Hoyt held that the Housing Authority had engaged in a course of conduct that created
an uninhabitable environment for the tenants and held that the Frost-Leland Amendment
intended to stop that course of action. He not only granted the temporary injunction but also
predicted that the residents would ultimately prevail in their claim, which formed the
underlying basis for this suit.17 8 The underlying basis of the suit, the fight that the residents'
hoped eventually to win, rested on the residents' argument that they had standing to sue the
177 Resident Council of Allen Parkway Village V. U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
C. A. No. H-89-0292. Order.
178 Resident Council of Allen Parkway Village v. U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
C. A. NO. H-89-0292, entered April 13, 1989.
101
Housing Authority. In a preview of his opinion on the question of the residents' standing,
Judge Hoyt explained that, although the residents have no right to live in Allen Parkway
Village, they can require the Housing Authority to provide 'decent, sanitary and safe
housing.'179
The Resident Council rejoiced in the victory. The temporary injunction constrained the
Housing Authority from several courses of action inimical to the survival of the public housing
development. Judge Hoyt' s decision also gave the residents reason to anticipate an even
greater victory in the final judgement-forcing the Housing Authority to renovate. The Resident
Council wanted the Housing Authority not only to stop assisting the deterioration of Allen
Parkway Village, but also to start restoring the development to habitability.
Although the Housing Authority rescinded its application to HUD seeking approval for
demolition, the agency vowed to appeal Judge Hoyt's decision.180
1991 Victory, Permanent Injunction
District Court Judge Hoyt gave Allen Parkway Village's residents cause to rejoice again when, in
1991 he granted a permanent injunction. Although HACH had withdrawn its application to
HUD, Hoyt ruled that live issues existed as long as HACH refused to use allocated federal funds
available for renovation. (The 1979 10 million dollar grant still had not been used for any
renovation.) Specifically, the court: Prohibited HACH from using federal funds to 'promote,
advance or explore the demolition of Allen Parkway Village, ordered HACH to account for all
federal funds issued to the Authority since 1979, ordered HACH to submit a plan for the
renovation and rehabilitation of Allen Parkway Village, granted permanent injunction under
179 Specifically, the decision argued that "residents are allowed to sue per Monele v. New York City Dept.
of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978) supporting the conclusion that municipalities are "persons.. .Once
it is established that the Plaintiff is a resident of a public housing facility, that tenant may enforce any
federal statutory right appertaining to that status and the facility, particularly where the activity
complained of falls into an area protected or regulated by statute. .. "
180 Houston Chronicle, February 26, 1989.
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Frost-Leland, and ordered HUD to set aside the remaining funds from the 1979 $10 million
allocation. 181
The Resident Council exulted in their victory. Assured that the Housing Authority could
not at this point legally proceed with demolition, the residents felt, for the first time, that they
had gained the upper hand. The residents drew much more value from the decision than
simply relief at having legal restraints placed on the Housing Authority. The Residents' Council
hoped the decision would enhance its ability to build power from the community, would give
the residents precious time to bring other pressure to bear on the mayor, and would increase
credibility for their efforts. The strategy of leveraging the positive outcome in the courts
suggested that the residents did not intend to rely solely on the courts to solve the conflict, but
that the successful lawsuit could support other ongoing efforts to convince the City to embrace
the residents' vision.
Neighboring Freedmen's Town residents shared in the Allen Parkway Villagers' victory.
Freedmen's Town resident Jacqueline Beckham hoped that the victory would bring in more
supporters, people who had resisted joining the residents because the situation seemed futile.
Allen Parkway Village resident-activist Wessie Scyrus echoed Beckham's interpretation of how
the Resident Council's success would affect other residents of the neighborhood: "They
[residents] felt that there was no way poor, Black people could stand against an avaricious
system, but now those people are praising God and singing hope."18 2
Lenwood Johnson, indefatigable President of the Resident Council, hoped to amplify the
scope of the verdict to influence the Mayor's overall affordable housing program and anticipated
that the reprieve would give them more time to change the political climate. He promised that
"we're not going to be idle. We're going to start trying to bring some pressure to bear on the
mayor so she can tell her housing department to provide housing for low-income people and
use those resources that are available."1 83
181 Abstracted from the U. S. District Court of Appeals reversal. Resident Council of APV v. HUD, et al.
980 F. 2d 1043; 1993 U. S. No. 91-2454.
182 Houston Defender, April 14, 1991.
183 IBID
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In addition to giving the residents time to try to sway the Houston City Council and
Mayor Whitmire, the verdict lent the residents increased credibility. According to Ms.
Beckham, before the verdict the developers and the city councilors that wanted to raze Allen
Parkway Village never considered the residents much of a threat. When they dealt with
Lenwood Johnson, "they didn't know he was a force to be reckoned with because he's Black,
he's poor, he lives in the ghetto and so, therefore, [they were saying] we just won't pay any
attention to him."184 In the aftermath of the 1991 verdict, few stakeholders found it possible
not to pay attention to the residents.
The Housing Authority complied with the Judge's order and submitted a plan to use the
remaining money allocated by HUD to renovate 150 units, but also filed a notice of appeal.
Chagrined by the Housing Authority's scheme to renovate only a fraction of the units, the
residents continued to press for a complete renovation of 1000 units, and continued to press
for resolution of its existing 1987 suit against the Housing Authority. Judge Hoyt's decision,
then, granted the residents a reprieve, but did not resolve the longstanding dispute, as both
sides persisted in pursuing legal action.
1992 Mediation
Faced with an increasingly litigious dispute, Judge Hoyt ordered the Resident's Council
into mediation with the Housing Authority in April, 1992. The Residents' Council, confident
that the courts would side with them should their suit make it to trial, balked at the forced
mediation. After the residents skipped several meetings, Judge Hoyt publicly redressed them,
signaling an end to his perceived partisanship towards the public housing residents. Calling
the Resident Council paranoid, he explained that they had to learn to work with the Housing
Authority, and to stop looking towards the courts to manage the dispute. 1 8 5
184 IBID
185 Houston Chronicle, December 11, 1992.
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In this case the Resident Council felt betrayed not by the judge or their elected leaders
but by their own counsel, Gulf Coast Legal Foundation. Although Gulf Coast had provided
excellent representation during the trial, the residents objected to the foundation's handling of
their interests during the mediation process. Against the residents' wishes Gulf Coast agreed
to hire Conflict Management, Inc. (CMI) a nationally recognized mediation firm specializing in
Alternative Dispute Resolution. The residents believed that CMI's prior relationship with
Houston's City Council biased the firm towards the Housing Authority. Indeed, later
accusations by other mediation firms of unfair bidding backed up the residents' theory.
Boycotting the mediation, however, only drew the wrath of Judge Hoyt, nearing the end of his
patience with the residents' complaints.
Frustrated with the Resident Council obstinate attitude towards the mediation, CMI
approached residents individually in an effort to circumvent the Resident Council's authority to
speak on behalf of all Allen Parkway Village tenants. Reverend Vincent Thompson, a member
of the advocacy group The Houston Housing Concern, characterized Conflict Management,
Inc.'s attempt to approach the residents individually as an effort to divide and conquer, by
dividing the Black and Vietnamese residents.186 Meanwhile, Gulf Coast met with Judge Hoyt
without reporting back to the Resident Council.
After eight months of negotiations, the Housing Authority believed a solution to the
dispute was forthcoming. Although the court had placed a gag order on all parties,
participants later reported that they thought the residents would finally agree to some
reduction in public housing units on the Allen Parkway Village site if the Housing Authority
would agree to renovate and maintain those units properly. To the surprise of the other
disputants, Lenwood Johnson led the residents in walking out of the negotiations. By speaking
to the press about why he left the mediation, Johnson faced a charge of contempt of court.
Believing that the facilitators only asked concessions only of the residents, and not of the
public housing authority, Johnson told the press: "I cannot continue to let poor people be
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186 Houston Press, August 12, 1992
compromised."187 The Resident Council President explained in his contempt of court hearing
that Gulf Coast had met with the Judge without informing residents and had refused to bring
residents' concerns about the process directly to the Judge. Judge Hoyt declined to cite
Johnson or the other residents for contempt.188 The Resident Council dismissed Gulf Coast as
their legal counsel and contracted members of the Houston Housing Concern to act as legal
counsel during the next few years.
Members of the Resident Council risked jail to avert acquiescing to any loss of public
housing units. Press coverage of the walkout, however, revealed a growing lack of sympathy
with the residents. Even sympathetic Houstonians had tired of the seemingly endless dispute.
After nearly twenty years of using litigation and public relations to constrain the Housing
Authority, these twin strategies were nearing the end of their effectiveness.
1993 Defeats
By walking out of the mediation, the Resident Council indicated that they believed they
would fare better in the court system. Two cases would be argued in 1993: the long standing
1987 suit in which the tenants argued that the Housing Authority's mission to provide housing
to low income people obliged the agency to renovate all 1000 units and the Housing Authority's
appeal of the 1991 decision that it had violated Frost-Leland by using federal funds to demolish
Allen Parkway Village.
The United States Court of Appeals dealt a severe blow to the residents' legal strategy by
overturning Judge Hoyt's 1991 verdict. Agreeing with the Housing Authority's contention that
the residents did not have standing to sue the Housing Authority, the court did not rule on
whether or not the Housing Authority had violated Frost-Leland. Essentially, the court argued
that Frost-Leland did not impose a binding obligation on public housing agencies. The court
did leave room for future action by the residents, since they would have standing to sue HUD.
Were HUD to ... approve an application by HACH to demolish all or part of APV, the
residents of APV would undoubtedly have the right to review HUD's final agency action
187 Houston Chronicle, December 11, 1992.
188 Houston Chronicle, February 3, 1993.
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for compliance with the Frost-Leland Amendment...As this case now stands, however,
HUD has simply not engaged in any final agency action that is reviewable.189
The Housing Authority was then free to continue to allow Allen Parkway Village to decay and
even to spend federal money to demolish it, as long as HUD, or any other federal agency, was
not a part of the decision. Although the court's decision favored the Housing Authority, the
residents could at least be sure that, if HUD were to approve a demolition plan, they would
have standing to sue under Frost-Leland.
Later in 1993, the court rendered an unfavorable, and surprising, decision on the
pending 1987 lawsuit. Judge Hittner ruled that residents had only received the right to sue for
project improvements since 1988. Since only 111 units were occupied at that time, the
residents could only require the Housing Authority to restore 111, rather than the full 1000
units the residents had always demanded. This decision, coupled with the earlier dismissal of
the injunction, left HACH free to plan to raze most of Allen Parkway Village. Frost-Leland still
would prevent HUD from using federal funds to demolish the complex, but the Housing
Authority now faced far fewer obstacles than in 1991, when Judge Hoyt had ordered the
Authority to use available resources for renovation and to cease all plans to raze Allen Parkway
Village. The residents vowed to appeal. But the Housing Authority, with the important
patronage of new Mayor Bob Lanier, had developed a plan to end-run the Frost-Leland
Amendment. The final solution to the problem of Allen Parkway Village would not be decided in
the courts' 90 .
Hope VI:
In response to the residents' boycott of mediation, the Housing Authority took a very
aggressive approach to pursuing demolition, without input from community groups. Mayor
Bob Lanier entered the fray, strongly supporting the Housing Authority's application to HUD's
HOPE VI program. HUD introduced HOPE VI in 1993 to address the nation's most severely
189 Resident Council of Allen Parkway Village v. U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, et
al. United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. No. 91-2454.
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distressed public housing. The highly competitive grants, some in excess of $50 million,
allowed public housing authorities great flexibility in reshaping distressed public housing,
much of which gets slated for demolition.191 The Housing Authority of the City of Houston
applied for nearly $40 million which, along with the remaining $8.9 million from the 1979
grant, would renovate only 150 units of Allen Parkway Village, raze the remainder, build some
replacement housing onsite, and sell off the rest of the land. To the dismay of the resident
leadership, the housing authority board voted unanimously to approve the demolition.1
92
Repeal of the Frost-Leland Amendment
Once HUD awarded the Hope VI grant to redevelop Allen Parkway Village, the residents
knew that they had lost ground, perhaps irretrievably. Throughout, the residents believed
they still had their ace in the hole, the Frost-Leland Amendment. If the Housing Authority
proceeded to raze Allen Parkway Village without replacing the units, the residents could still
sue. Quietly, without the knowledge of the residents or the press, Congress repealed Frost-
Leland in June 1996. Resident Council President Lenwood Johnson later explained that
Houston Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee had supported the repeal, believed necessary for
the lucrative HOPE VI grant to be disbursed.193 The Housing Authority evicted the remaining
residents later that same month.
Conclusion
Resident Council President Lenwood Johnson described the residents' legal strategy as
an effort to "find out the rules, make the City obey the rules that are being broken or ignored,
and figure out how to change the rules to help us."194 The Resident Council found out that the
190 Houston Post, August 13, 1993.
191 http://www.hud.gov:80/prodesc/hopevia.html. April 26, 1999.
192 Houston Chronicle May 20, 1993
193 Lenwood Johnson phone interview. March 23, 1999. Repeal of Frost-Leland: Public Law 104-134.
The Congressional Record records Congresswoman Lee's objection to the repeal of Frost-Leland in
November, 1995 but no further debate was entered. The repeal was introduced in March , and became
law in June.
194 Lenwood Johnson interview. March 27, 1999.
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Housing Authority used racial steering to disrupt the residents' organization and political clout.
They found out that the Housing Authority used many illegal procedures in soliciting
applications and pursuing evictions, and they tested the legal limits of their standing, as public
housing residents, to require the Housing Authority to comply with its mandate to provide
affordable housing to Houston's low-income residents. And for a while at least the residents
managed to change the rules, by introducing the Frost-Leland Amendment.
No-one, not the residents, not the Housing Authority, not the City Council and not the
general public ever thought, in 1978, that the question of whether or not to demolish Allen
Parkway Village would take nearly twenty years to resolve. The danger in using a litigious
strategy for such a long dispute, then, lay in the exhaustion of sympathy caused by endless
cycles of lawsuits and in the far superior resources the Housing Authority of the City of




How could this happen in 1999?
The recent destruction of Allen Parkway Village and most of Freedmen's Town seems to
be an anachronism, the kind of mistake that cities used to make in the era of urban renewal.
Closer examination reveals that the destruction began not in 1999 but in 1977 when the first of
a series of mayors committed to tearing down Allen Parkway Village and voiced the belief that
the transformation of Freedmen's Town was inevitable. From city hall, it was clear that
downtown was expanding westward, moving inexorably towards Freedmen's Town. Why
shouldn't the city think like a developer and maximize its holdings? The mayors listened to the
developers, agents of the glorious Houston real estate market, and sought to liquidate the city's
holdings. Each mayor imagined that he or she would be the one who finally removed the blight
of this neighborhood and paved the way for the expansion of Houston's corporate palaces.
Each of the city's efforts failed. HUD turned back four demolition applications, no
developer bought into the city's packaging of the Fourth Ward, Founder's Park failed to
generate support, and Houston Renaissance collapsed without building a single house. Yet
each of these efforts contributed to the slow death of this community. While the city failed to
effect a planned transformation of Freedmen's Town, it nevertheless managed to starve the
community by failing to perform its perfunctory obligations: trash piled up, sewers and streets
collapsed, and Allen Parkway Village was abandoned, even though funds existed to perform
these duties. In sum, the near-destruction of this community happened not in 1999, when the
bulldozers were most prominent, but over the past twenty years, during which time the city
acted in the interests of real estate developers, and not in the interest of citizens.
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How could this happen in Houston?
The mayors justified their interventions in Freedmen's Town with the language of the
real estate market. The land was too valuable for poor people to live on. They were not the
highest and best use. By erasing the publicly subsidized housing that served as a buffer
against the gentrification of Freedmen's Town, the city would free the real estate market to
decide what was the area's highest and best use. As long as the city intervened in the guise of
creating an unfettered market, the intervention made sense within Houston's dominant
political ideology of laissezfaire.
Apart from abdicating its responsibility to its citizens, the problem with the city's
strategy of following the lead of developers was that the developers were wrong. Indeed the
myopic vision of Houston's real estate developers in the late 1970s is now legendary. The city's
developers built so much excess space that the decade that followed became known as the 'see-
through years' since downtown was filled with empty skyscrapers that you could see through.
Despite this evidence of the developers' mistakes and the saturated market for downtown land,
Houston's mayors persisted in believing that Allen Parkway Village was a gold mine.
Why did it take so long?
Given the array of powerful forces aligned to wipe out Freedmen's Town, why did it take
so long? The downturns in the real estate market played a key role in preventing private
development during much of this period but did not explain the city's failure to demolish the
existing neighborhood. The refusal of Freedmen's Town and Allen Parkway Village residents to
accept the inevitability of unwanted development in their community prevented the city from
bulldozing the area decades ago. Ingeniously leveraging a myriad of support, from lawyers,
architects, suburbanites, activists and legislators, the residents kept challenging the city's right
to determine who should live in Freedmen's Town. Without building a constituency within city
hall, however, the residents were unable to change the prevailing idea that poor people should
IlI
not live on valuable land. Eventually, HUD developed a program that fit well with the city's
agenda to tear down Allen Parkway Village and the mayor conjured Renaissance Houston to
take over Freedmen's Town, vulnerable after years of neglect.
Although the residents did not win this struggle, neither did the mayors or the business
interests they served. The Allen Parkway Village site will not be sold and will be preserved for
some measure affordable housing. Residents did not want a mixed-income development that
destroyed Allen Parkway Village and offered fewer units of subsidized housing, but nevertheless
they prevented the absolute loss of this land as a resource of affordable housing.
As for the last mayor's grand scheme to redevelop Freedmen' s Town, Renaissance
Houston failed miserably. Although the residents of Freedmen's Town would not count the
purchase of over one-quarter of their community, the demolitions, and evictions of many of the
residents a success, they have not yet given up. As Renaissance Houston announced its
demise in March 1999, Gladys House, President of the Freedmen's Town Association, broke
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Conditions. 1992.
Houston Housing Authority. An Overview. 1978.
Houston City Planning. Housing Analysis, Low-Moderate Income Areas 1978.
Housing Authority of the City of Houston Annual Reports: 1940,1943, 1944-1945, 1957,
Freedmen's Town Historic District. National Register of Historic Places Inventory-Nomination
Form. United States Department of the Interior. National Park Service. 1984.
San Felipe Courts Historic District (Allen Parkway Village since 1964) National Register of
Historic Places Inventory-Nomination Form. United States Department of the Interior. National
Park Service. 1987.
Economics Research Associates. Working Paper on Phase A: Reconnaissance: Prepared for:
Houston Fourth Ward Advisory Committee. October 1, 1979.
Technical Report: Allen Parkway Village/Fourth Ward" Prepared for the Housing Authority of
the City of Houston, September 1983.
Audit of the Fiscal Year 1996 HOPE VI grant award process. Office of the Inspector General,
Department of Housing and Urban Development. 98-FO-101-0001. October 20, 1997.
Plans
Freedmen's Town Redevelopment Master Plan. Freedmen's Town Association. Houston, Texas.
Hill Swift Architecture and Urban Design. Houston, Texas. June 1996.
Legislation
Public Law 100-202. Section 415 of the Department of Housing and Urban Development-
Independent Agencies' Appropriations Act, 1988. Frost-Leland Amendment prohibiting
the use of federal funds for demolishing Allen Parkway Village.
Public Law 104-134. Omnibus Appropriations Act. April 26, 1996. Repeal of the Frost-Leland
Amendment.
Judicial Decisions
Grovey V. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45 (1935) Unsuccessful bid to end discrimination against
Blacks in the Democratic Party. Political parties judged to be voluntary associations.
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Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944) Successfully ends discrimination in the Democratic
Party. Supreme Court ruled that since Texas was effectively a one-party (Democratic) state,
barring entry to Democratic Party disenfranchised Black voters.
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 669 (1950) Supreme Court ruled that Texas must offer
opportunities for Blacks to pursue graduate studies, specifically law. Resulted in admission of
Heman Sweatt, and five others, to University of Texas Law School. In a frantic effort to provide
'separate but equal' facilities, the State of Texas sponsored creation of a 'black' law school,
Texas Southern, and funded creation of other graduate departments at Houston College,
renamed Texas Southern University.
UNITED STATES CODE OF 1953 (5th ed.)
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights. Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress. (R. S. § 1979.) Formed underlying basis of Resident's Council's suit against the
Housing Authority, which 'under color of statute' had deprived residents of right to affordable
housing, by violating Frost-Leland.
Texas Construction Group, Inc., et al., v. City of Pasadena, et al. No. A14-83-601CV. Court of
Appeals of Texas, Fourteenth District, Houston. Pasadena had sued HACH and construction
company over siting a new public housing development within mile of Pasadena's city limits,
without proper notice. (1983)
Lenwood Johnson, et al, v. The Housing Authority of the City of Houston, et al. No. A14-85-
205-CV. Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourteenth District, Houston. Reverses trial court's denial
of injunctive relief in case of evictions of Indo-Chinese from Allen Parkway Village. (1986)
Resident Council of Allen Parkway Village, on behalf of its members, et alia v. United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Civil Action No. H-89-0292. U. S District
Court for the Southern District of Texas. (1989) APV residents suit over misuse of federal
funds to demolish APV. Judge Hoyt orders HACH in 1991 to desist from demolishing, or
preparing to demolish APV until residents' lawsuit comes to trial. Dismissed in 1993.
Resident Council of Allen Parkway Village, et al., v. United States Department of Housing &
Urban Development, et al., No. 91-2454. United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.:
Reverses the district court's April 4, 1991 order awarding permanent injunctive relief against
HACH and HUD because the federal statute barring the use of federal funds to demolish certain
federally subsidized low-income housing projects didn't create a private cause of action in favor
of project residents.(1993)
Contracts and correspondence from the papers of Lenwood Johnson.
Resident Management Contract, Draft. Between Allen Parkway Village Resident Council and
Housing Authority of the City of Houston.
Draft Contract Between Housing Authority of the City of Houston and Allen Parkway Village
Resident Council. $300,000 technical assistance grant to resident council.
Memo stating the position of the Resident's Council of Allen Parkway Village on the grave site.
April 21, 1998.
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Letter from Stanley 0. Graves, Director, Division of Architecture to Joy Fitzgerald, Executive
Director of the Housing Authority of the City of Houston, voicing concerns that APV project is
not following historic preservation guidelines. March 10, 1998.
Letter from Christopher W. Hornig, Deputy Assistant Secretary to Lenwood E. Johnson,
articulating HUD's frustration with the Houston community's inability to work together - HUD
can't micromanage disputes. August 5, 1996.
A Critique and Response to the Technical Report Titles Allen Parkway Village/Fourth Ward.
Lenwood Johnson and Barry Klein. November 1983.
Allen Parkway Village Rehabilitation Proposal. Resident's Council of Allen Parkway Village.
September 19, 1993.
Fax to Andrew Cuomo from Resident's Council of Allen Parkway Village, in re: Impediments to
the Development of the Allen Parkway Community Campus (APCC) November 10, 1998.
Guiding Principals ("Stakes in the Ground') For the Development of the Allen Parkway
Community Campus. Signed by Lenwood Johnson and Henry G. Cisneros, Secretary U. S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development. March 22, 1996.
Allen Parkway Community Campus Concept Narrative. May 1994.
Friends in Defense of Allen Parkway Village. Pamphlet directed towards Freedmen's Town
congregations. Undated (but from 1998-1999)
Pamphlets:
Freedmen's Town Association, Inc Membership/Volunteer Application 1985.
Alumni, and Ex-Student Association of Colored High, Booker T. Washington Colored High,
Richard G. Lockett and Abraham Lincoln Schools of Freedmen's Town Membership Form. 1987.
Land Bank Trust. Unpublished pamphlet by the APV residents council.
Texas Trailblazer Series 2, Number 5. Richard Allen Editors Patricia Smith Prather and Bob
Lee 1996.
Texas Trailblazer Series 2, Number 21. Reverend Jack Yates. Editors Patricia Smith Prather
and Bob Lee 1996
Interviews
Bill Calhoun. President, Texas Casualty Insurance
Joshua Hill. Interim Dean, Texas Southern University
Gladys House. President, Freedmen's Town Association
Lenwood Johnson. Presient, Allen Parkway Village Resident Council
Saverio Giammalva. Residential and Commercial Real Estate Professional
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Barry Klein. President, Houston Property Rights Associaton
Patricia Smith Prather. Texas Trailblazers Preservation Association
Cary Wintz. Professor of History, Texas Southern University
Secondary Sources
Books
Barna, Joel Warren. The See-Through Years: Creation and Destruction in Texas Architecture and
Real Estate 1981-1991. Houston: Rice University Press. 1992.
Bayor, Ronald H. Race & The Shaping of Tweritieth-Century Atlanta. Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
Beeth, Howard and Cary D. Wintz. Eds. Black Dixie: Afro-Texan History and Culture in Houston.
College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1992.
Bullard, Robert D. Invisible Houston: The Black Experience in Boom and Bust. College Station:
Texas A & M University Press, 1987.
McComb, David G. Houston, the Bayou City. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969.
Siegan, Bernard H. Land Use Without Zoning. Houston: Bartholdi and Lazarus. 1993.
Silver, Christopher and John Moeser. The Separate City: Black Communities in the Urban South
1940-1968 Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1995.
Silver, Christopher. Twentieth Century Richmond. Planning, Politics and Race. Knoxville: The
University of Tennessee Press, 1984.
Thomas, June Manning and Marsha Ritzdorf, editors. Urban Planning and the African American
Community, In the Shadows. SAGE Publications, Inc. Thousand Oaks, CA. 1997.
Writer's Program of the Work's Progress Administration. Houston: A History and Guide.
Houston: Anson Jones Press, 1942.
Unpublished Theses, Dissertations and Papers
Luna, Charles Steven. Land Use Control in Houston: A Legal Analysis of Market Approach
Techniques. Unpublished Master's Thesis, MIT 1977.
Passey, Mary Louise. Freedmantown: The Evolution of a Black Neighborhood in Houston, 1865-
1880. Unpublished Master's Thesis, Rice University, 1993.
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Sapper, Neil Gary. A Survey of the History of the Black People of Texas, 1930-1954. Phd.
Dissertation. Texas Tech University, 1972.
Sorelle, James M. The Darker Side of 'Heaven': The Black Community in Houston, Texas, 1917-
1945. Phd. Dissertation, Kent State University, 1980.
Articles
Cuff, Dana. "Beyond the Last Resort: The Case of Public Housing in Houston," Places, A
Quarterly Journal of Environmental Design, Volume 2 Number 4 28-43.
Moorhead, Gerald. "The Final Days. Houston appears ready to play out the last scene of the
Allen Parkway Village saga." Historic Preservation. Volume 48 Number 2 March-April 1996.
Thomas, June Manning, "Planning History and the Black Urban Experience: Linkages and
Contemporary Implications," Journal of Planning Education and Research 14.1 (1994).
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